SINGAPORE’S 2027 ASEAN Chairmanship could become a turning point in the region’s fight against cross-border misinformation, according to Dien Nguyen An Luong, who argues that the chairmanship offers a chance to help member states connect seemingly isolated incidents and investigate coordinated deceptive networks. Writing for ASEANFocus+, Luong points out that Southeast Asia now faces an increasingly complex set of online manipulation challenges, including electoral falsehoods, AI-enabled extremist content, geopolitical manipulation and AI-generated deception. Some of these problems stem from domestic politics, where local actors amplify lies to exploit existing social divisions. Others involve foreign governments, commercial firms, or anonymous operators who run campaigns across national borders, making it difficult for any one country to grasp the full extent of the threat. The concern for policymakers, Luong explains, is not merely that false claims appear online. Such claims can mislead voters about what candidates actually said or did, distort public understanding of sensitive territorial disputes by portraying them as armed confrontations, or be engineered to inflame nationalist sentiment. AI-generated material adds another layer of risk because it can be produced quickly, tailored for specific audiences and distributed through social media before fact-checkers can intervene. The result is an information environment where misinformation is not an occasional problem but a structural feature of digital politics. The central question, therefore, is whether ASEAN can move beyond general statements and help members identify the networks behind coordinated campaigns that span multiple countries. Singapore’s 2027 chairmanship, Luong suggests, could be used to test whether such cooperation works in practice, without forcing member states to agree on the truth or falsehood of every disputed political claim. By concentrating on the mechanics of influence operations—fake accounts, reused scripts, distribution patterns and concealment methods—ASEAN could add a regional layer to what are currently fragmented national responses.
Electoral misinformation is one of the most significant concerns in Southeast Asia, because it feeds on existing political loyalties and complicates informed voting. During Indonesia’s 2024 election, fabricated speeches attributed to political figures circulated widely online, and research found that voters’ pre-existing political loyalties helped determine which deepfakes they believed. That finding suggests AI-generated misinformation can reinforce partisan divisions rather than persuade voters through rational argument. Luong notes that local journalists and fact-checkers, who understand the nuances of their own politics, are usually better placed than regional bodies to refute such fabricated content. Still, the problem extends beyond elections. Misinformation has also circulated around territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea. In separate incidents in 2024 and 2025, misleading videos falsely claimed that the Philippines had attacked and destroyed Chinese vessels. One video repurposed footage from a military exercise, while the other used fabricated news reports. These claims can whip up nationalist anger and make already contentious disputes even harder for the public to assess rationally. Another growing concern is the misuse of AI by extremists. AI-generated TikTok videos have portrayed deceased militants involved in terrorist attacks, illustrating how the technology can make extremist narratives more sensational and easier to circulate. Luong’s point is that while these examples are all serious, they are not all alike. Some are primarily domestic problems. Others involve foreign actors, and still others seem to involve coordinated operations that cross borders. The appropriate response depends on which category a particular case falls into.
The fact that several ASEAN countries face similar misinformation challenges does not automatically mean they need a regional response. For instance, fabricated speeches targeting candidates in Indonesia’s election are best handled by Indonesian journalists and fact-checkers who know the country’s political landscape. Even foreign interference does not always merit ASEAN intervention. Luong highlights an October 2025 Reuters investigation that uncovered a Chinese-funded operation using a Manila-based marketing firm to spread messages supporting Beijing’s interests and discrediting the United States in the Philippines. The operation relied on fake Filipino social media identities, making the messages appear to come from local users rather than an external sponsor. But while the operation had a foreign sponsor, the investigation did not establish that the same campaign extended to other ASEAN countries. Understanding this distinction is crucial: foreign involvement alone does not necessarily make a case a regional problem requiring an ASEAN-level response. A stronger case for regional cooperation arises when related deceptive campaigns concern more than one ASEAN country. Luong cites a July 2026 investigation by CNA, which uncovered more than 550 TikTok videos from 30 accounts spreading misleading claims about both Singapore and Malaysia. The videos included claims that China’s Hainan Free Trade Port would undermine Singapore’s position as a major shipping hub, and that policies sidelining ethnic Chinese had held back Malaysia’s development. The accounts reused scripts and synthetic presenters, suggesting a coordinated production network. However, the investigation could not determine who operated the accounts or whether a foreign government was involved. This is precisely the kind of case, Luong argues, where regional cooperation could add value. Investigators in different countries could compare their findings on accounts, narratives and distribution patterns to determine whether these isolated incidents are actually part of a broader regional operation.
ASEAN member states have already agreed on some basic principles of cooperation. A 2018 framework called for collaboration on fact-checking and media literacy, and a 2023 guideline drew a careful distinction between misinformation, which is false information spread unintentionally, and disinformation, which is deliberately spread to deceive. But coordinated influence operations present a different kind of challenge. They may involve fake accounts or hidden sponsorship even when some of the messages are factually accurate. ASEAN could therefore help member states investigate who is behind such campaigns and how they are orchestrated, without requiring governments to agree on whether disputed domestic political claims are true or false. Beyond guidelines, ASEAN has also launched concrete initiatives. The ASEAN Foundation’s Digital Literacy Programme reported reaching nearly 194,000 people through workshops by November 2023. In 2025, ASEAN information ministers acknowledged the work of the ASEAN Task Force on Fake News and various information-sector working groups. These are tangible activities, but participation figures do not establish whether people actually became better at identifying misinformation. Nor do they show whether ASEAN has tested joint investigations of deceptive networks operating across borders. Luong argues that this is the next step: moving from training and declarations to practical cooperation on specific suspected campaigns. The European External Action Service offers one model. Its investigations into foreign information manipulation examine the networks, intermediaries and infrastructure behind coordinated campaigns, and the FIMI Explorer tool helps investigators trace connections between those operations. The EU’s Digital Services Act Transparency Database, meanwhile, publishes platforms’ reasons for removing or restricting content, making those decisions open to public scrutiny. ASEAN lacks the EU’s legal powers to force Big Tech companies to disclose such information, but it can still adapt the investigative methods and explore a regional incident-reporting network.
Some of the relevant measures in ASEAN’s 2026–2035 Work Plan for Information and Media are not scheduled for implementation until 2029 or later. Singapore could therefore use its 2027 chairmanship to propose early trials of selected measures. One starting point is to make cross-border deceptive campaigns easier to investigate. Under Action 5.8 of the work plan, ASEAN member states are encouraged to cooperate against cross-border threats involving the misuse of digital technologies. Through ASEAN’s information-sector officials, the bloc could test a proposed incident-reporting network against a handful of suspected cross-border campaigns. Member states, social media platforms and independent researchers could compare where content first appeared, which accounts or scripts were reused, and what remains unknown about the operators. By pooling their findings, investigators could see whether the same accounts or networks were behind campaigns targeting different countries, without each country having to investigate the same accounts separately. Another issue is what social media platforms reveal about deceptive campaigns. Under Action 5.11 of the work plan, ASEAN envisages reports on takedowns of misinformation. But knowing how many posts were removed tells investigators little about who is behind the campaigns, how the accounts are connected, or whether the same networks operate across different countries. TikTok already publishes reports on covert influence operations, which provide a useful starting point. But these reports alone may not establish whether the same operators are behind deceptive campaigns targeting different ASEAN countries. Luong suggests that Singapore, building on earlier ASEAN initiatives, could bring together interested member states and independent researchers to compare these platform reports with findings from existing investigations. Where information is missing, they should ask platforms for clarification. Even if the platforms decline to respond, the exercise would still establish what investigators know and what remains unclear. It would not require governments to disclose their own takedown requests, so it could proceed without compromising national security or diplomatic sensitivities.
Better reporting, however, is only part of the response. Investigators also need the skills to examine the material behind suspected deceptive campaigns. Under Action 2.12 of ASEAN’s work plan, the bloc proposes training hubs covering fact-checking and the use of AI tools in newsrooms. Singapore could build on these earlier efforts by giving the proposed training a practical focus: using AI-assisted translation to compare claims across languages, and checking whether audio or video has been manipulated. Independent fact-checkers, journalists and researchers could practice these checks together, and participants could be tested on sample material before and after training, which would provide useful evidence about whether the training actually works. This approach would respect editorial independence because it would not require governments to control content or dictate what fact-checkers should conclude. Luong concludes that the onus is not on ASEAN to intervene every time misinformation surfaces in one of its member states. Many cases are best handled domestically, by journalists, fact-checkers and civil society groups that understand local conditions. But when deceptive campaigns involve actors and networks operating across borders, individual countries may struggle to establish the full picture. Singapore’s 2027 Chairmanship could help determine whether ASEAN cooperation can close that gap. By testing incident-reporting networks, improving platform transparency, and offering practical training in AI-related investigation techniques, ASEAN could move from declarations to action. The chairmanship is an opportunity to prove that the region can respond collectively to coordinated cross-border influence operations, while respecting the sovereignty of member states and avoiding unnecessary intervention in domestic affairs. Whether ASEAN seizes that opportunity will depend on the political will of its members, but the groundwork laid in recent years provides a credible foundation for a more active regional role.