Sweden warns Russia’s bot army is targeting Germany, France and Europe’s major elections
Russia has deployed an army of automated social media accounts and digital influence operatives to interfere in elections in Germany, France and other major European countries, according to Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency. Magnus Hjort, a senior official with the agency, said elections provide an “opportunity” for Vladimir Putin’s information war machine to try to polarize and divide European societies. The Kremlin’s key objective, Hjort added, is to make voters doubt whether their politicians should keep sending money and weapons to Kyiv by peddling fake stories about Ukrainian corruption and other alleged abuses. While Russian disinformation has long been a concern, Hjort’s warning is unusually specific: Moscow is primarily targeting Europe’s most powerful nations, with particular attention to regional votes in Germany and the upcoming French presidential campaign. In both countries, far-right parties seen as more sympathetic to Russia are poised to make record gains. Germany’s Alternative for Germany and France’s National Rally have both questioned EU solidarity with Ukraine and called for reducing military assistance, aligning closely with Kremlin messaging. If those parties continue to rise, European governments may find it increasingly difficult to sustain the financial and military support that Ukraine depends on. Hjort suggested that the Russian strategy is not necessarily to dictate election winners, but rather to create widespread confusion, public fatigue, and distrust in democratic institutions. The result, he warned, could be a more fragmented Europe, a weaker NATO and a Ukraine forced to consider negotiations from a disadvantageous position. The warning carries extra weight because Sweden, a country that has historically positioned itself as a neutral state, is now a NATO member and has developed one of Europe’s most sophisticated systems for detecting and resisting foreign influence.
Hjort called on social media platforms such as Meta, TikTok and X to step up efforts to dismantle networks of automated accounts, commonly known as bots, that spread foreign disinformation and run influence campaigns. His language was direct. “Social media giants have their agenda which is to make money,” Hjort said. “We have a different agenda. We want to get rid of bot networks targeting our democracies. Of course, they do not want them on their platforms. That’s not the issue, but it’s a hassle to remove them.” The comments reflect growing frustration among European security officials who believe tech companies are not moving quickly enough to identify coordinated inauthentic behavior. Hjort said his agency sees a “constant flow” of foreign information manipulation and interference, from countries including Russia, China and Iran. In recent days, his team found evidence of a Russian-aligned attempted disinformation campaign using the so-called Matryoshka, or Russian doll, method. The name is fitting because the operation is multi-layered. First, a suspicious video or article appears online. Then emails are sent to fact-checkers, journalists and researchers saying “look what the Russians are doing.” The recipients, eager to debunk Russian propaganda, open the material and start investigating it. Some may publish a debunking, but in doing so they spend valuable time on a small, staged distraction while other, more serious threats go unnoticed. “The idea is for them to pick this up, go to the actual video clip or whatever it is and then publish it with a debunking saying, ‘This is false,’ and, you know, wasting their time in looking at this,” Hjort explained. The technique turns the very people who fight disinformation into unwitting accomplices in the Kremlin’s larger effort to exhaust democratic institutions.
The Swedish agency has also documented a concrete example of a bot network in action. Hjort said Sweden has pinpointed one state actor responsible for a network of 1,200 accounts on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, targeting Sweden and other countries. The accounts began by discussing innocuous topics such as vacations and sport, a common tactic designed to make them look like real users and to allow them to build a history of organic activity. This “sleeping” phase can last months, making it more difficult for automated detection systems to flag the accounts as fake. Eventually, the network shifted to publishing intentionally divisive views, fiercely in favor of or against key political questions. In total, the network published 50,000 posts and comments in 2025 and 2026. On the surface, that number may not seem enormous by social media standards, but the goal is not necessarily to dominate trending topics. The purpose is to seed polarization, amplify extreme opinions, and create the false impression that society is deeply fractured. Interestingly, the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency assessed that, at the moment, it does not see any coordinated campaign targeting Sweden from this particular network. That suggests the operation may be used as a testing ground or directed at other countries, with the infrastructure ready to be activated when needed. Hjort believes the best way to deal with such campaigns is simply to deny them engagement. If ordinary users, journalists and political leaders refuse to share the inflammatory content, the bots lose their ability to influence public conversation. Denial of engagement sounds passive, but in reality it requires active media literacy, self-restraint and a collective decision to focus on facts rather than outrage.
The warning arrives at a politically delicate time across Europe. In Germany, the far-right, pro-Russian Alternative for Germany party achieved a significant result in the Saxony-Anhalt state election on September 6, securing a substantial share of the vote and confirming its status as a major force in the country’s east. The AfD has repeatedly demanded an end to German weapons deliveries to Ukraine, calling instead for a return to energy cooperation with Russia and an immediate ceasefire on Moscow’s terms. While the party’s success in a single regional election does not mean it is close to national power, it sends a strong signal that anti-Ukraine sentiment is gaining strength in German politics, and it complicates the federal government’s efforts to maintain a unified pro-Kyiv stance. In France, the stakes are even higher. Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally and a prominent contender for the April 2027 presidential election, is currently leading in the polls. Le Pen has softened her image over the years, but her party has consistently opposed EU sanctions against Russia and questioned the wisdom of open-ended military aid to Ukraine. A Le Pen victory would be one of the most consequential political events in Europe, with the potential to alter the balance of power inside the EU, weaken NATO’s collective resolve, and reshape the future of European security. Hjort’s remarks suggest that the Kremlin is fully aware of these dynamics and sees the German and French electoral calendars as a chance to deepen public anxiety over the cost of living, migration and the war itself, all in ways that benefit pro-Russian parties.
The broader threat landscape extends far beyond Russia. Hjort said the Swedish agency sees a “constant flow” of foreign information manipulation and interference, from countries including Russia, China and Iran. Each country has its own strategic interests and preferred tactics. China has focused primarily on shaping debates about trade, technology and its policies around Taiwan, often using state media and diplomatic channels rather than covert bot networks. Iran has engaged in influence operations and cyber-enabled intimidation aimed at dissidents and regional adversaries. But Russia remains the most active operator in the European electoral sphere, with a well established toolkit that includes troll farms, fake news sites, stolen documents, deepfakes and thousands of automated accounts. Social media platforms are the central battlefield. Hjort’s criticism of Meta, TikTok and X is particularly significant because these platforms have the data, technology and personnel to identify coordinated campaigns, but they have also been criticized for inconsistent enforcement. Removing bot networks is difficult, time-consuming and often commercially unappealing, because fake accounts can inflate engagement metrics and keep users online. The European Union has adopted regulations aimed at forcing platforms to take greater responsibility for election-related risks, but implementation remains uneven. Hjort’s comments add to a growing body of official evidence that platform self-regulation is not enough and that governments must play a stronger role in protecting their democratic processes from foreign manipulation.
Ultimately, Hjort argues, the most effective response is a combination of vigilance, institutional resilience and public awareness. The Matryoshka method demonstrates that even fact-checkers can be manipulated, which means every actor in the information ecosystem must be skeptical. Denying engagement does not mean ignoring disinformation; it means refusing to amplify false narratives and focusing instead on the networks behind them. Once a bot network is exposed, as in the case of the 1,200 X accounts, its credibility collapses and its future usefulness is limited. But exposure depends on access to data and close cooperation between governments, civil society and technology companies. Hjort’s message is both a warning and a reassurance: Russian disinformation is real, sophisticated and ongoing, but it is not unbeatable. The coming electoral months in Germany and France will be a serious test of democratic endurance. Hjort said the goal is clear. “We want to get rid of bot networks targeting our democracies,” he said. That requires not only better laws and stronger platforms, but also a public that is willing to think, question, and refuse to be used as a tool in a foreign power’s information war. The bot armies are constantly growing, but so are the defences of democratic societies that have learned to recognize the Russian doll for what it is.