IEC Launches Disinformation Code and Real411 Reporting Platform Ahead of 2026 Local Government Elections
With the 2026 Local Government Elections on the horizon, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has moved to fortify the integrity of the electoral process by introducing the Electoral Code of Conduct on Countering Disinformation. This new code, which applies directly to political parties and candidates contesting the elections, establishes a clear set of rules governing the spread of false or misleading information, both online and offline. The code is effective from the date it comes into operation until the moment election results are officially declared, creating a binding framework for all contestants throughout the election cycle. To enforce this code, the IEC is leveraging the Real411 platform, an independent digital complaints system administered by Moxii Africa. This organisation has the requisite capacity to independently investigate complaints of disinformation and recommend remedial actions to both the IEC and digital platforms where harmful content is hosted. The IEC, in turn, considers the reports generated through Real411 and can take one of two primary paths: it may issue public communications on its own social media channels flagging the content as disinformation, or release official statements correcting the record. Alternatively, it may escalate matters to the Electoral Court, which has the authority to consider the case and impose sanctions on transgressors who breach the code. This dual-pronged approach is designed to ensure that false information is not only corrected publicly but also deterred through the possibility of legal consequences.
Central to the code is a clear and precise understanding of what constitutes disinformation, as opposed to other forms of false or misleading content. Disinformation is defined as information that is false or misleading and is shared by someone who knows it is not true, or who has no reasonable basis for believing it to be true, with the specific intention of misleading voters or disrupting the electoral process. This deliberate malicious intent distinguishes it from misinformation, which refers to false information shared without such intention, often simply because a person failed to verify the facts before forwarding or posting it. Although the distinction lies in intent, the damage caused by both is equally severe: bad information travels rapidly and can materially influence how, and even whether, people vote. It is important to note that the code does not target satire, opinion, fair criticism, or genuine political debate. Harsh criticism of a party or candidate, no matter how unflattering, is not disinformation; the code is aimed specifically at content that is deliberately false and designed to deceive. The IEC has identified several common forms of disinformation likely to emerge ahead of the elections. These include false claims about voting dates, times, venues, or voter eligibility; fake statements or announcements falsely attributed to the IEC or its staff; scams that pose as the IEC, such as fraudulent job advertisements; manipulated or AI-generated synthetic images, audio, or video used to mislead voters; fake accounts or bot networks created to exaggerate the popularity of a particular view; doxxing, which involves sharing someone’s private information online without consent to cause harm; and political advertisements or AI-generated content that is not clearly labelled as such. These examples illustrate the breadth of tactics that could be deployed to undermine public trust in the electoral process.
Recognising the sheer volume of content circulating online, the IEC has provided practical guidance to help voters distinguish between reliable information and disinformation before they share anything election-related. The first step is to scrutinise the source: voters should ask where the information came from and whether it originates from a credible media outlet or a verified official account. The IEC regularly updates its information on elections.org.za and through its verified social media channels under the handle @IECSouthAfrica, so any claim not traceable to these sources should be treated with suspicion. The second indicator is emotional impact; content designed to mislead is often crafted to provoke anger, fear, or anxiety, precisely because these emotions drive impulsive sharing. If a post triggers such a reaction, that should be a cue to pause and slow down. Thirdly, voters should ask whether the information can be corroborated elsewhere. A genuine story about voting dates, venues, or IEC decisions will typically be reported by multiple credible sources, so if a claim cannot be found anywhere except a single post, caution is warranted. Visual content also requires careful inspection. Voters should watch for mismatched lighting, unnatural movement, oddly shaped hands, or blurred edges, all of which are common signs of AI-generated or manipulated media. Finally, labelling matters: under the Disinformation Code, political advertising and AI-generated content must be clearly marked as such. If such content is not labelled when it should be, that in itself is a basis for reporting. The overarching advice is simple: when in doubt, pause, check, and if still uncertain, report rather than share. Voters are also encouraged to conduct their own fact-checking by going directly to official sources for any information about voting dates, venues, registration, or results, using the IEC website, its WhatsApp Channel, or its official social media pages. Searching for the claim in a few words to see if reputable news outlets are covering it, running reverse-image searches on suspicious photos, and checking the profile of the account posting the information are all quick and effective verification methods. New accounts with no history or names that are almost but not quite identical to official accounts should be treated as red flags.
For those who encounter suspicious photographs, the IEC has offered a detailed explanation of reverse image search, a technique that allows internet users to search using an image instead of text. This method helps determine where else a photo has appeared online, when it was first published, and in what context. It is particularly useful for spotting images that have been recycled, cropped, or relabelled to mislead people, such as an old photograph from a different country or event being passed off as current. The IEC has outlined practical steps for conducting a reverse image search. On Google Images, users can go to images.google.com, click on the camera icon, and upload the photo or paste its URL, after which Google displays other places where the image appears online. TinEye, a platform built specifically for this purpose, allows users to upload an image and view its earliest known appearance and all matches, sorted by date. On a mobile phone, users can long-press an image or take a screenshot and then use the “Search image” option available in Google or Chrome. If the earliest match appears to be from years ago or from a location different from the one claimed in the accompanying post, that is a strong signal that the photo is being used out of context. By arming voters with these relatively simple tools, the IEC hopes to reduce the spread of misleading visual content, which has become increasingly sophisticated in the age of generative AI.
When a voter identifies content they believe constitutes disinformation related to the 2026 Local Government Elections, the official channel for reporting is Real411, the independent platform that handles digital election-related complaints. The reporting process begins with the complainant visiting Real411 or using the Real411 app to submit a complaint. While complaints cannot be submitted anonymously, the identity of the complainant is kept confidential in the outcome. The submission must include a link or screenshot of the content in question, along with as much detail as possible about where and when the content was seen. Once submitted, the complaint follows a structured four-stage process. First, the complaint is lodged with supporting evidence. Second, the Digital Complaints Committee reviews the complaint to determine whether it falls within the scope of the code. Third, a sub-committee makes a decision on the appropriate action, which may include referral to the IEC, the police, the South African Human Rights Commission, the Press Ombud, or the Electoral Court, depending on the nature and severity of the content. Fourth, the complainant is notified of the outcome and guided on how to appeal if relevant. If the complainant disagrees with the decision made by the Real411 Digital Complaints Committee, they may approach the Secretariat in writing to lodge an appeal with the Appeals Committee. The appeal must include the complaint ID and the reasons for the appeal, and should be sent to [email protected]. Complaints are handled in all eleven official languages of South Africa, and outcomes are published on the platform once a decision has been reached, ensuring transparency and accountability in the process. This structured reporting mechanism is intended to be accessible and efficient, enabling ordinary citizens to play an active role in protecting the electoral environment from manipulation.
Beyond formal reporting, the IEC has called on the public to take personal responsibility for reducing the impact of disinformation. The most important message is simple: do not be the one who spreads it. If content makes you angry or afraid, that is the moment to verify it rather than share it. The IEC also encourages individuals who have previously shared content that is later confirmed as disinformation to share the correction, not just the original claim. Correcting the record with the same people with whom the false information was shared is a crucial step in limiting the damage. In addition, the IEC has invited citizens to become more actively involved in safeguarding online spaces through the Real411 Rover Spotter programme. Becoming a Rover Spotter means joining a community of digital volunteers who help keep South Africa’s online spaces safe by spotting fake news, suspicious posts, hate speech, and disinformation, and by assisting with fact-checking efforts. This community-driven approach recognises that the scale of online content is too vast for any single institution to monitor alone, and that an informed and engaged public is one of the most effective defences against manipulation. At the same time, the IEC has stressed that the code does not limit freedom of expression. Fair comment, satire, opinion, and robust political debate remain fully protected, even when unflattering to a particular party or candidate. The code targets deliberate falsehoods, not disagreement. As the 2026 Local Government Elections approach, the IEC’s message to voters is clear: the integrity of the election depends as much on the actions of ordinary citizens as on the institutions entrusted with its administration. By staying vigilant, verifying information, and using the tools available through Real411, South Africans can collectively ensure that the election is decided by facts, not fiction.