How Kremlin Disinformation Finds a Footing in Finland: Inside a Small But Persistent Pro-Russian Media Ecosystem
Finland has long been regarded as one of Europe’s most difficult targets for foreign information manipulation and interference. For years, the country has ranked high in international assessments of societal resilience to disinformation, thanks to high levels of media literacy, a strong education system, robust public trust in state institutions, and the active work of fact-checking initiatives. That reputation is well earned, but it does not mean Finland is entirely immune. Beneath the surface, a small but persistent ecosystem of pro-Russian websites and “alternative media” continues to operate, spreading a standard set of Kremlin narratives despite European Union sanctions targeting such platforms. Their audiences remain limited compared with leading national broadcasters and news outlets, but they are part of a wider information environment that Moscow has carefully cultivated for years. A detailed study by analysts at Insight News, examined by the StateWatch Think Tank, provides a close look at the structure and operation of this network. The study shows that Russian propaganda has long moved beyond the centralized dissemination of messages. Modern hybrid warfare relies on decentralized networks in which Russian state media, conspiracy theorists, far-right figures, and local opinion leaders amplify one another without direct organizational control. The most effective tool in this system is “information laundering”: moving content from unreliable sources into more credible-looking mainstream platforms by continually repackaging narratives and selectively amplifying them. Rather than simply copying Russian state narratives, Finnish pro-Russian outlets adapt Kremlin talking points to domestic political debates. Issues such as NATO membership, migration, national sovereignty, trust in the media, and economic instability serve as additional flashpoints to advance Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. By the time a Kremlin narrative reaches a Finnish reader, it has often been translated, localized, and stripped of any obvious connection to Moscow.
The architecture of this pro-Russian media ecosystem is remarkably diverse. It includes so-called “counter-media,” geopolitical analysis platforms, “peace” organizations, ultranationalist publications, conspiracy portals, and news aggregators. Each outlet plays a distinct role in the network. MV-lehti is the primary conduit for Kremlin messaging. UVMedia gives pro-Kremlin narratives a pseudo-academic veneer. Murkut.org amplifies and “launders” pro-Kremlin narratives through redistribution. Naapuriseura legitimizes pro-Russian views through the language of peace and civic rhetoric. Magneettimedia reinforces pro-Kremlin narratives through antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories. Finland.news-pravda.com directly disseminates Russian state-media narratives as part of an international Kremlin platform. Despite their different formats and audiences, these outlets share a common ideological core. They portray Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a forced defensive response to Western expansionism. They delegitimize Ukrainian statehood by associating it with fabricated Nazism and widespread corruption. They depict the European Union as an authoritarian entity serving global elites, and they present Helsinki’s foreign policy as an absurd surrender of sovereignty. These narratives reinforce one another, creating an alternative reality for regular readers and for people vulnerable to disinformation. The network’s tight interconnection is not accidental. By citing one another, republishing similar narratives, and exchanging hyperlinks, these outlets create the impression that their claims are supported by multiple independent sources. In reality, they are often repackaging the same origin story from different angles. This is a classic technique of hybrid warfare, where the goal is not necessarily to persuade the majority, but to create confusion, deepen distrust, and provide ready-made explanations for those who already feel alienated from mainstream politics and media.
At the center of the network is MV-lehti, one of the oldest and most visible vehicles for pro-Russian propaganda in Finland. The website spreads disinformation, racist content, and anti-European rhetoric. Its founder, Ilja Janitskin, was convicted in Finland of defamation and incitement to hatred. Since 2019, the outlet’s editor-in-chief has been Janus Putkonen, who previously ran the Russian-funded DONi-News media project in Russian-occupied Donetsk. Under Putkonen, MV-lehti has been completely reoriented toward republishing material from Russian state media such as RT, Sputnik, TASS, and Russian Telegram channels. According to SimilarWeb data for May 2026, MV-lehti receives around 870,000 visits per month, accounting for nearly 90 percent of all traffic to Finland’s pro-Russian websites. Its primary role is to adapt the Kremlin’s strategic messaging to the local context, integrating it into populist criticism of migration, elites, and EU-related domestic issues. Closely linked to MV-lehti is UVMedia, also known as Uusi Verkkomedia. While MV-lehti appeals to emotions, UVMedia positions itself as a pseudo-intellectual platform, presenting itself as an independent analytical outlet. It promotes narratives claiming that NATO expansion inevitably provoked Russia, that sanctions hurt Europe more than Moscow, and that the war against Ukraine is a “defensive operation.” The information is packaged in a format that can appear to be credible, well-reasoned analysis, making it particularly dangerous for readers who might reject overt propaganda but accept what looks like alternative expertise. Another key node is Murkut.org, a news portal that describes itself as a collection of “news from independent media.” The website functions as a distribution hub, aggregating content from a network of pro-Russian outlets. Although the role of an aggregator may appear passive, its impact is significant. By republishing material from multiple sources, Murkut.org creates the illusion that false claims are being corroborated by several independent outlets, even when all of them originate from the same Kremlin messaging machine.
Naapuriseura is an example of Kremlin narratives being wrapped in the appealing language of peace and dialogue. The outlet openly describes itself as “pro-Russian” and declares that its goal is to “restore friendly relations with the eastern neighbor.” It accuses the Finnish government and media of “Russophobia” and calls NATO membership a mistake. By appealing to values such as peace and good-neighborly relations, Naapuriseura seeks to legitimize Russia’s demands and present Ukraine’s capitulation as the only path to ending the war. This is a subtle but effective way of normalizing aggression. Magneettimedia, by contrast, makes no effort to soften its message. It combines support for the Kremlin’s foreign policy with overt neo-Nazism and antisemitic conspiracy theories. Its articles portray the war in Ukraine as part of a conflict between Russia and a “global Jewish mafia” that allegedly controls the United States, NATO, and the European Union. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is described as a “defensive special military operation” intended to save Donbas from “Zionist-Nazi battalions.” While such content is extreme, it plays a role in the ecosystem by reinforcing deeply held prejudices and drawing in audiences from far-right movements. Finland.news-pravda.com represents yet another layer of the network. It is the Finnish component of the international Pravda (Portal Kombat) disinformation network, which was created in Crimea between 2010 and 2013. The network expanded rapidly in 2023 and 2024, launching country-specific news sites designed to resemble domestic media outlets across Europe. The Finnish node directly republishes statements from Russian state institutions while presenting itself as a local news outlet. Its content conditions audiences to believe that NATO, the Baltic states, and Finland are potential aggressors, thereby justifying possible Russian “defensive” actions. Together, these outlets form a web of influence that reaches different segments of society: people looking for emotional outrage, people seeking intellectual justification, people attracted to peace rhetoric, and people already committed to far-right ideologies.
Across this pro-Russian media ecosystem, six recurring narratives form the backbone of an alternative version of reality. The first is that Ukraine is not a legitimate state. In this version of reality, Ukraine is an artificial creation, a “terrorist state,” or a “mafia zone.” Russia’s aggression since 2014 is reframed as a “civil war in Donbas,” and constant associations with Nazism are meant to strip Ukrainian resistance of the moral legitimacy of self-defense. The second narrative is that Russia had no choice. Moscow is never the aggressor; it is always reacting to someone else. The 2022 invasion becomes a forced response to NATO expansion and a supposedly imminent attack, recasting an act of aggression as preemptive self-defense. The third narrative turns the tables on Western support for Ukraine: the real aggressors are NATO and the European Union. Rising defense spending and military aid are described not as responses to Russian aggression, but as evidence of a Western campaign to weaken or destroy Russia. The fourth narrative is specifically aimed at Finnish audiences: Finland is a puppet stripped of sovereignty. NATO membership and defense cooperation with the United States are framed as Helsinki’s complete abandonment of its independence, and Finland is portrayed as a forward staging ground for a war against Russia. The fifth narrative weaponizes the word “peace.” Western assistance to Ukraine is described as “prolonging the bloodshed,” while accepting Russia’s terms is presented as the path to peace. The sixth narrative is the most corrosive of all: you cannot trust the institutions around you. Governments, journalists, experts, and scientists are all trying to deceive ordinary people. Once that premise is established, Russian Telegram channels and counter-media outlets are offered as the only reliable alternative. The dissemination of these narratives follows a clearly defined chain from Moscow to Finland. Russian state media and official channels produce the initial message. It is then picked up by pro-Russian websites, which translate and adapt it. Aggregators redistribute it, and social media users amplify it. At each step, the message is repackaged and stripped of its original Russian markers. By the time it reaches a Finnish reader, it may appear not as foreign propaganda, but as patriotic criticism of Finland’s own government, NATO, and the European Union.
The European Union has not been blind to this challenge. In March 2022, in the first days of the full-scale invasion, the EU imposed tough sanctions that effectively cut off the Kremlin’s principal mouthpieces—RT (Russia Today) in all its language versions and the Sputnik news agency. European operators were prohibited not only from broadcasting their content, but also from “facilitating or otherwise contributing to” its dissemination. The EU subsequently expanded and refined these lists in an effort to shut down official channels for Russian disinformation. The Kremlin, however, did not give up. It shifted into digital camouflage mode. Whenever an official RT or Sputnik website was blocked, propagandists created a mirror clone on a new domain or launched supposedly “independent” media projects. Investigations conducted in 2024–2026 exposed an entire network of sanctions-evasion mechanisms. The Spanish-language version of Sputnik, for example, was relaunched under the NoticiasLatam name. Networks of websites and Telegram channels, including projects belonging to the Pravda family, were deployed across Europe to repackage Kremlin talking points. Brussels eventually ran out of patience. In April 2026, the EU adopted a fundamentally new provision in a fresh sanctions package: the automatic and rapid blocking of clone websites. Under the new rules, European regulators no longer need to spend months establishing the culpability of each individual domain. If an outlet copies, quotes, republishes, or distributes content from sanctioned Russian media, it can be blocked under an expedited procedure. In a separate decision, the EU immediately blocked a specific list of identified RT and Sputnik clone websites, effectively closing this loophole. Finland’s experience demonstrates that even the highest levels of media literacy and strong public trust in state institutions cannot completely eliminate pro-Russian disinformation networks. That may be the most important lesson for Ukraine and its Western allies: Russian propaganda is often most effective when it no longer looks Russian. By the time a Kremlin narrative reaches a Finnish reader, it has been translated, repackaged, and stripped of any obvious connection to Moscow, appearing instead as domestic criticism of NATO, the EU, or Finland’s own government. Combating this threat requires more than just blocking websites. It requires constant monitoring, public awareness, and cross-border cooperation to expose the links between seemingly independent outlets and the Kremlin’s wider information machinery.