As Germany approaches critical regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania this September, a growing cloud of suspicion surrounds the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. German lawmakers and security analysts have raised urgent concerns that the AfD, which currently leads polls in key eastern states, may be benefiting from a coordinated Russian disinformation campaign. The stakes are historically high, as the AfD aims to secure its first regional government victory since 1945, a prospect that threatens to undermine the ruling coalition led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Evidence of this alleged interference has surfaced through the work of “Antibot4Navalny,” a group of activists monitoring Kremlin-linked networks. Following the discovery of a malicious operation, the group identified two distinct waves of disinformation—dubbed “Matryoshka”—which utilized sophisticated tactics to mimic reputable German media outlets. These campaigns deliberately targeted mainstream parties with fabricated reports of corruption and scandal while pointedly excluding both the AfD and the pro-Russian, far-left BSW party from the smear tactics, suggesting a calculated effort to manipulate public sentiment.
Security officials and political analysts argue that Moscow and the AfD are effectively working in tandem, creating a cycle of “hybrid warfare.” Konstantin von Notz, vice-chair of the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee, asserts that the Kremlin provides the initial fabricated narratives, which are then amplified and broadcast by the AfD to a domestic audience. The Russian embassy has vehemently dismissed these allegations as “ridiculous,” framing them as part of a dangerous anti-Russian path pursued by European authorities, while the AfD maintains that it is merely a victim of political persecution by the establishment.
The response from the German government remains a subject of domestic debate. While federal intelligence agencies acknowledge the threat posed by “information manipulation operations,” they have been hesitant to launch aggressive countermeasures. Intelligence officials, including CDU lawmaker Marc Henrichmann, have cautioned that overly heavy-handed public interventions could inadvertently grant these disinformation campaigns the very oxygen they seek—an unwanted increase in visibility. Consequently, the government faces pressure to balance the need for national security with the risk of escalating the perceived influence of fringe content.
At the heart of the conflict is a broader “cognitive war” that observers suggest Russia is waging to fracture German society. By exploiting local anxieties regarding economic stagnation, energy prices, and migration, Moscow aims to erode public support for Germany’s ongoing military and financial aid to Ukraine. Supporters of the AfD, however, reject the “puppet” narrative, arguing that their platform—which advocates for normalized relations with Russia and the resumption of cheap energy imports—is based purely on pragmatic national interests rather than foreign influence.
As the September 6 and 20 election dates loom, the divide between the political establishment and the far-right base reflects a deeply polarized nation. While the reach of the current disinformation campaigns has been documented as relatively limited in scope, the potential for these digital provocations to sway undecided voters in closely contested regions remains a significant concern. For policymakers, the challenge now lies in neutralizing the influence of external interference without deepening the very divisions that the Matryoshka operation seeks to exploit.