Aneet Morar Argues Kremlin Disinformation Is Only a Symptom of a Deeper Crisis of Platform Accountability
In a letter published in response to the Guardian’s editorial on Russian disinformation, Aneet Morar has issued a powerful challenge to policymakers, arguing that the Kremlin’s interference in British public life cannot be understood in isolation from the wider failure to regulate digital platforms. The Guardian had already noted that Andy Burnham’s warning about the Russian threat only tells half the story, with foreign manipulation depending on domestic complicity. Morar goes further, insisting that disinformation is one symptom of a systemic problem: the platforms that now function as critical national infrastructure are operating without the safeguards that would be demanded of any comparable institution. The letter, which draws on Morar’s career in the payments industry, draws a stark comparison between the heavily regulated world of financial infrastructure and the largely unaccountable world of social media. At the heart of the argument is a simple but profound point: platforms that shape what millions of people believe should not be held to a lower standard than those that move their money. The letter arrives at a time of growing concern about the influence of foreign actors on British democracy, but it redirects attention away from the bots and trolls and toward the algorithmic systems that amplify their messages.
Morar’s intervention broadens the debate from foreign interference to a comprehensive critique of engagement-driven design. The letter identifies a wide spectrum of harms already visible across society. The same amplification mechanics that allow Russian propaganda to spread are also damaging young people’s mental health, as algorithms optimise for emotion, outrage and attention rather than for truth or wellbeing. This is not a separate problem from foreign disinformation; it is the same machinery operating towards different ends. Morar also points to the acceleration of far-right radicalisation at home, citing the Guardian’s analysis of the disorder in Belfast and Southampton. The letter argues that the same feeds that surface Kremlin content also push domestic extremists towards one another, creating a shared ecology of resentment, conspiracy and violence. The newest frontier is wearable technology. Meta’s smart glasses, Morar warns, now make recording people without their knowledge or consent a routine part of daily life. This is a privacy violation enabled by the same platforms that profit from continuous engagement. In this view, the threat from Russia is not a unique evil but the sharpest edge of a model that systematically prioritises virality over safety, exposure over consent and corporate growth over collective wellbeing.
The letter insists that the government’s response to disinformation, while necessary, is not sufficient. Morar acknowledges that the state must step up its efforts to counter Kremlin bot armies and foreign influence operations. But focusing on Russia alone, without addressing the infrastructure that allows its messages to reach mass audiences, is to treat the symptom rather than the disease. The solution, according to the letter, lies in making platforms face real consequences for the content they amplify. Morar calls for enforceable duties of care, penalties that are proportionate to the scale of the harm, and genuine transparency about how algorithms decide what users see. These are not abstract demands. They are the basic elements of any credible regulatory regime. In the absence of such measures, platforms can continue to claim that they are neutral hosts while their algorithms simultaneously amplify foreign propaganda, radicalise vulnerable users and harvest attention from children. The letter argues that the current situation is unsustainable and that the burden of proof should shift: platforms must be required to demonstrate that their systems are safe before they are allowed to deploy them at scale.
Morar’s professional background in the payments industry gives the argument particular force. In the financial world, infrastructure operating at this scale would never be allowed to run without clear rules, independent oversight and liability when things go wrong. Payment networks must comply with rigorous anti-money-laundering obligations, consumer protection laws and sanctions requirements. They are audited, supervised and held accountable for systemic failures. The comparison is deliberately striking. No bank would be permitted to say, as social media platforms routinely do, that it bears no responsibility for the transactions it facilitates. No payment system would be allowed to deploy a new product while refusing to disclose how it works or what harms it might cause. Morar asks why the platforms that shape public belief should be treated with greater lenience than those that manage public money. The answer, the letter suggests, is that there is no good reason. The gap in standards is not a reflection of different risks but of different levels of regulatory maturity. Society has learned, over many decades, that financial infrastructure requires governance. Digital infrastructure, which is younger but far more pervasive, has not yet been forced to learn the same lesson.
The argument has significant implications for the future of regulation in Britain and beyond. Morar describes platforms as critical national infrastructure, a designation usually reserved for energy, transport, water and communications. This framing matters because it changes the nature of the debate. If social media is merely an entertainment service, then regulation appears as an intrusion on freedom and innovation. But if it is infrastructure, then regulation is a public safety requirement. The letter does not propose a specific regulatory model, but it clearly gestures toward the kind of regime that should replace the current patchwork. Enforceable duties of care would mean that platforms are legally obliged to prevent reasonably foreseeable harms. Penalties proportionate to scale would stop fines from being treated as a cost of business. Algorithmic transparency would allow regulators, researchers and the public to understand how recommendations are generated and where responsibility lies. The letter also implies the need for independent oversight from a body with real teeth, not a regulator that exists mainly for consultation. In the payments world, regulators have powers to issue binding guidance, conduct inspections and impose sanctions. A comparable digital regulator would need the same authority if it is to earn public confidence.
The letter’s conclusion is a call to address the cause rather than the symptoms. Tackling the Kremlin’s bot armies matters, Morar argues, but until platforms are held responsible for what they amplify, across every segment of society, the underlying vulnerability will remain. This is a crucial point because foreign disinformation will not be the last threat. The same infrastructure that allows Russia to manipulate British voters also permits domestic actors to spread harmful health misinformation, incite racial hatred and engineer addiction in children. If regulators focus only on foreign state actors, they will fail to build the resilience needed to withstand future shocks. Morar’s letter is a reminder that the crisis of disinformation is not primarily a technological failure or a security failure. It is a political and regulatory failure. The question is no longer whether platforms have too much power. The question is whether governments are willing to treat them as what they have already become: the most important communications infrastructure of the twenty-first century. Until that question is answered, no amount of counter-disinformation strategy will be enough. We will continue to respond to the latest Kremlin exploit, the latest viral rumour, the latest tragedy, without confronting the system that makes all of them possible. Morar’s letter is a demand for a fundamental shift in approach, one that places responsibility at the centre of the digital world, just as it has long been placed at the centre of the financial one.