The landscape of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in Georgia has undergone a fundamental transformation. What was once a battlefield dominated by external Kremlin-run media and shadowy foreign proxy networks has shifted toward the “internalization” of these methods by domestic political elites. The European Commission’s 2025 report confirms that the Georgian government and its aligned media platforms—specifically TV Imedi, POSTV, and Rustavi 2—have increasingly mirrored Russian-style disinformation, adopting a cohesive strategy that mirrors Kremlin messaging to undermine the European Union and democratic institutions from within.
The Georgian Dream government has effectively localized Russian strategic narratives, repackaging them as domestic issues of sovereignty, national identity, and traditional values. By framing the EU as a “civilizational threat” and propagating conspiracy theories—such as the “second front” narrative claiming the West intends to drag Georgia into war—the government has successfully blurred the lines between genuine political discourse and foreign propaganda. This strategy effectively paints dissenters, independent NGOs, and civil society as “foreign agents,” leveraging state-controlled infrastructure to delegitimize the very institutions tasked with democratic accountability.
Evidence of this state-sponsored propaganda machinery is extensive, with major platforms operating as central nodes in a coordinated network. Meta’s Q2 2024 Adversarial Threat Report exposed how state-linked entities used fictitious personas to manipulate public perception, reflecting the broader operational convergence between the government’s Department of Strategic Communications and mainstream media outlets. This media landscape is characterized by the systematic amplification of pro-government, anti-Western rhetoric, often featuring controversial international commentators whose views are consistently echoed by Russian state media.
Operational techniques used by these Georgian actors further prove their adoption of foreign tactics. This includes synchronized information dissemination across various media platforms to create an illusion of consensus, the use of AI-generated synthetic media to discredit political opponents, and the persistent application of “comparapaganda”—distorting events in Western democracies to justify domestic authoritarian crackdowns. Such tactics were highlighted when the UK imposed sanctions on key broadcasting figures in 2026, marking a significant milestone in international recognition of these networks as integral components of Russian information operations.
This evolution poses a severe challenge to democratic resilience, as the traditional model of countering FIMI—which focuses on isolating and neutralizing external, foreign-backed sources—is no longer sufficient. When the government itself serves as the chief agent of information manipulation, it makes attribution and defense deeply complex. By normalizing conspiracy theories and framing the EU as an antagonist, these domestic actors have eroded public trust in electoral and civil processes, effectively insulating themselves from accountability while weakening Georgia’s alignment with Western security institutions.
To address this, international policymakers must categorize “internalized FIMI” as a distinct hybrid threat. Future resilience strategies must shift from solely monitoring foreign interference to empowering the domestic actors, independent journalists, and civil society organizations that are currently targeted by the state. This requires a broader sanctions approach that targets domestic facilitators of propaganda, stronger oversight by technology companies to detect coordinated inauthentic behavior, and a commitment to shielding those who defend European values in Georgia from being silenced by the very government that should be protecting them.