In Fakers: A Top-Secret Tale of Phantoms and Forgeries on the Disinformation Front Line, historian Rory Cormac provides an illuminating look at the Information Research Department (IRD), a shadowy British Cold War unit that operated from 1948 to 1977. By utilizing previously classified records from the National Archives, Cormac explores the IRD’s mandate to conduct “unconventional forms of counter-subversive activity.” The book bridges the gap between serious geopolitical history and the surreal antics of espionage, chronicling bizarre operations that ranged from seeding rumors in Indonesia to undermining political figures in Africa, all while maintaining a serious focus on the strategic utility of information as a tool of statecraft.
The origins of the IRD reflect a pivot in post-WWII British foreign policy. Initially, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was reluctant to engage in active propaganda against the Soviet Union, hoping instead to rely on the “positive results” of the British democratic model. However, following escalating Cold War tensions and Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe, the Cabinet authorized the IRD in 1948. Effectively tasked with providing counter-communist publicity, the department evolved over the following decades into a sophisticated entity, characterized by the author as “bigger, bolder, and more global,” eventually utilizing “fake channels” to launder intelligence and discredit Soviet proxies worldwide.
Cormac’s work is particularly valuable for its focus on the “Special Editorial Unit,” a clandestine wing that specialized in deception. While critics might dismiss the IRD’s more outlandish schemes—such as creating fake political organizations like the “Loyal African Brothers”—as amateurish, the author argues that such assessments miss the systemic nature of the struggle. During this era, Soviet disinformation was aggressive and wide-ranging, viewing propaganda and kinetic military action as two sides of the same coin. The IRD was not merely a collection of eccentric conspirators; it was a necessary, state-sanctioned response to a global campaign of ideological sabotage that threatened the stability of Western alliances.
A recurring, crucial theme in Fakers is the persistent difficulty of measuring the impact of disinformation. Throughout the IRD’s existence, officials frequently struggled to prove that their covert campaigns were yielding tangible returns, often falling back on the belief that “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” While leaders like Nigel Clive sought concrete metrics of success, the nature of psychological warfare meant that results were often delayed, hidden, or subtle. This historical dilemma remains strikingly relevant today, as modern states grapple with similar challenges in evaluating how digital influence operations affect social stability and democratic trust.
The relevance of the IRD’s legacy is underscored by the modern digital landscape, where disinformation is now disseminated instantaneously through sophisticated technological platforms. Even though the methods have shifted from “paper and ink” to social media algorithms, the underlying objectives—denigrating morale, weakening trust in institutions, and sowing confusion—remain remarkably consistent. Cormac highlights that while we are now much better at identifying the “incidence” of disinformation—knowing when and by whom it is being spread—measuring its precise “impact” on specific outcomes like elections or public health remains notoriously elusive.
Ultimately, Fakers serves as both a compelling narrative of Cold War intrigue and a vital reference for contemporary national security policymakers. Cormac’s work demonstrates that even if a disinformation campaign lacks measurable, short-term success, it represents a genuine act of hostility that must be countered to preserve democratic values. The book’s core lesson is that the difficulty of proving the efficacy of deception should never be an excuse for inaction. In the ongoing battle to protect our way of life, identifying and confronting these phantom threats is as essential today as it was during the height of the Cold War.

