Summary: Russia Intensifies Disinformation Campaign in Poland, Exploiting WWII Historical Grievances to Undermine Support for Ukraine
Russia has significantly escalated its disinformation operations targeting Poland, leveraging a long-standing historical dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv over the Volhynia massacres of World War II to deepen public mistrust and erode support for Ukraine. Unlike past campaigns that relied on fabricated stories, this new wave of influence warfare is more insidious: it takes real, painful events and reframes them within a context favorable to the Kremlin’s strategic objectives. Polish officials and independent researchers warn that the goal is to strain the relationship between Ukraine and one of its most steadfast allies, particularly as Poland prepares for parliamentary elections in 2027 and grapples with growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment among its population. The campaign, which has seen a sharp uptick in Polish-language social media activity, is designed to create the false impression that hostility toward Ukrainians in Poland is rapidly and organically intensifying, thereby justifying further polarization and weakening the Western alliance supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression.
The core of the historical dispute centers on the Volhynia massacres of 1943–1945, during which Polish historians estimate that Ukrainian insurgents killed approximately 100,000 ethnic Poles in territories that were then part of occupied Poland. Thousands of Ukrainians also died in retaliatory killings carried out by Polish forces. This traumatic chapter has long been a source of tension between the two nations, but it had been largely managed through diplomatic restraint and a shared focus on opposing Russia. That equilibrium shattered earlier this year when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy named a military unit after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), an organization whose members were implicated in the massacres. Poland viewed this as a provocative act of historical revisionism. In June, Polish President Karol Nawrocki responded by stripping Zelenskyy of Poland’s highest state distinction—the Order of the White Eagle—a dramatic diplomatic rebuke that immediately inflamed public discourse. The Polish government’s own escalation provided fertile ground for Russian information warfare. According to Pawel Olszewski, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Digital Affairs, the number of Russian disinformation messages on social media and official Russian platforms like Telegram rose sharply in the wake of this incident. Some of these materials were quickly picked up and circulated by Polish media outlets, creating a feedback loop that amplified the conflict.
The scale of the influence operation is staggering. The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) conducted a detailed analysis of activity across major social media platforms including X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. Its assessment concluded that following President Zelenskyy’s controversial decision, the volume of Polish-language anti-Ukrainian content increased by more than 250%. PISM analyst Filip Bryjka noted that a significant portion of this surge was artificially generated by automated bot networks and coordinated inauthentic accounts. These bots are programmed to post, like, and share inflammatory content at a rate that far exceeds human capacity, thereby creating a deceptive appearance of widespread grassroots anger. The campaign’s effectiveness lies in its subtlety: unlike crude disinformation that can be easily debunked, these messages often reference real events—the actual massacres, the genuine diplomatic fallout, or legitimate grievances about Ukrainian refugees—but frame them in a way that maximizes division and mistrust. “The event is real, but its interpretation is imposed by an external actor,” explained Wojciech Pokora, an analyst at the Info Ops Poland Foundation. This technique makes the disinformation harder to detect and refute, because it does not rely on obvious falsehoods that fact-checkers can flag. Instead, it weaponizes authentic historical pain and contemporary frustrations, twisting them to serve Moscow’s geopolitical agenda.
The campaign has found a receptive audience in a country already experiencing “Ukraine fatigue” and growing far-right political sentiment. Poland currently hosts approximately 1.8 to 1.9 million Ukrainian refugees and migrant workers, a significant influx that has strained housing, healthcare, and social services in some areas. An IBRiS poll released in early July showed that 33.6% of respondents said their attitude toward Ukrainians had worsened after the recent historical dispute escalated. Another July IBRiS survey recorded a dramatic decline in support for continued military aid to Ukraine: from 78% in 2022 to just 52% today. While external Russian manipulation is a contributing factor, experts stress that the negative sentiment cannot be blamed solely on bots. Disputes over grain imports, which saw Polish farmers blockading border crossings to protest cheap Ukrainian grain flooding the market, have also fueled resentment. Additionally, a segment of the Polish population has grown weary of what they perceive as a one-sided burden of supporting Ukraine while facing their own economic challenges. Sociologists note that in recent months, Ukrainians living in Poland have increasingly reported experiencing overt hostility and xenophobic attacks. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has publicly called for an end to such incidents, but his government, which is pro-European and a strong supporter of Ukraine, now faces a difficult political calculus: how to maintain solidarity with Kyiv without alienating a portion of the domestic electorate.
The political context of the approaching 2027 parliamentary elections is critical to understanding the stakes. Donald Tusk’s coalition government, which relies on a broad pro-European and pro-NATO mandate, is facing a serious challenge from far-right and nationalist parties that have historically been skeptical of EU integration and hostile to mass immigration, including Ukrainian refugees. Polling data suggests that Tusk will have a difficult task in retaining power next year. The far-right Confederation party (Konfederacja) and other hardline nationalist groups have already begun campaigning on a platform of “Poland First,” calling for stricter controls on Ukrainian refugees and an end to military aid. Russian disinformation operations naturally exploit this opening. By amplifying anti-Ukrainian messages, they help to legitimize far-right narratives and push the entire political spectrum to the right on the issue. Deputy Minister Olszewski acknowledged that the flow of disinformation concerning the historical dispute “found a receptive environment” in a society where many already held mixed feelings about the Ukrainian presence. The danger, according to analysts, is that the disinformation campaign could tip the balance in an already closely contested election, potentially leading to a government less committed to supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russia. This would be a strategic victory for the Krermlin, which seeks to fracture the European Union’s united front in supporting Ukraine and to demonstrat that its neighbors cannot maintain a cohesive long-term policy.
The Russian government categorically denies any involvement in these operations. The Russian Embassy in Warsaw issued a statement asserting that “the Russian Federation does not interfere in relations between other states. Accusations that Russia spreads disinformation in order to undermine support for Ukraine are unfounded.” Moscow claims that Western leaders are deliberately exaggerating the threat from Russia for their own political purposes, a familiar refrain in its information war. Nevertheless, evidence gathered by Polish intelligence, independent research institutes like PISM, and civil society organizations like Info Ops Poland paints a clear picture: the Kremlin is investing heavily in manipulating Polish public opinion precisely because Poland is a linchpin of NATO’s eastern flank and a key transit hub for military aid to Ukraine. The campaign is sophisticated, blending historical grievances with contemporary economic and social tensions, and it leverages real events to build credibility. As the 2027 elections approach, the risk is that even if a majority of Poles still support Ukraine in principle, the noise created by the disinformation campaign could shift policy outcomes. For now, Polish authorities are urging vigilance, digital literacy, and cross-border historical dialogue between Warsaw and Kyiv to deprive Russian propaganda of its most potent raw material: the genuine, unhealed wounds of the past. The challenge will be whether Poland can defend itself from this soft of influence warfare without further damaging its relationship with a neighbor fighting for its survival.