Africa’s Emerging Disinformation Landscape: Homegrown Influence Networks and Transnational Campaigns
The digital sphere, once hailed as a democratizing force, has become a battleground for information warfare. A recent study by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has shed light on a concerning trend: the rise of local online influencer networks in Africa and their increasing involvement in transnational disinformation campaigns. This revelation shifts the focus from external actors like Russia or China to homegrown networks, emphasizing the need for African democracies to bolster their defenses against this evolving threat. The 2024 South African elections served as a stark example, with the Electoral Commission and other democratic institutions targeted by coordinated disinformation campaigns pushing false narratives.
The ISS research highlights the growing significance of network affiliations across the African continent. Self-proclaimed online personalities, lacking accountability and transparency, are wielding substantial influence by manipulating narratives and commanding large audiences. They achieve this by forging alliances with influencers across borders, sharing fabricated content, and employing sophisticated techniques to game social media algorithms, ensuring maximum visibility for their posts. Interviews with prominent South African influencers, motivated by ideology or financial gain, revealed their active involvement in exporting their tactics and expertise to other African countries, including Kenya, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. This transnational collaboration expands the reach and impact of disinformation campaigns, posing a significant threat to democratic processes across the continent.
One particularly concerning tactic employed by these influencers is “rage bait,” designed to provoke emotional responses and increase engagement. A South African influencer admitted to leveraging pre-existing South Africa-Kenya rivalries to generate antagonistic interactions on social media, thereby building his audience through negative engagement. This manufactured outrage creates the illusion of organic debate, masking the manipulative tactics employed by external actors. Furthermore, such coordinated transnational campaigns exploit social media algorithms, prioritizing certain narratives while suppressing others, effectively distorting the information environment. Similar tactics have been observed in other countries, including Rwanda, where these methods are used to stifle dissent.
While overt foreign influence in the South African elections appeared limited, the study did identify instances where prominent influencers claimed to have been paid by Russian agents to amplify destabilizing narratives. While this claim requires further verification, it raises concerns about the potential for external actors to co-opt local networks to advance their own agendas. Adding further complexity, the study noted the presence of content related to global issues like the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts within the material amplified by those engaged in spreading election disinformation, suggesting a possible blurring of lines between domestic and foreign influence operations.
The ISS research also revealed the significant influence exerted by political parties through online communities, primarily on platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook. The study found that the two most dominant online communities were associated with the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) parties, both of which employed paid influencers, including those ideologically aligned with their respective parties. This raises questions about transparency and the potential for manipulation of public opinion through covert online campaigns. In contrast, the Democratic Alliance, while having a substantial online presence, opted for traditional political advertising, which offered greater transparency in terms of funding and political affiliation.
The rise of disinformation poses a significant challenge to democratic processes in Africa. While social media offers unprecedented opportunities for information access and holding power accountable, it has also become a fertile ground for the spread of misleading narratives. The ISS study underscores the urgent need for effective countermeasures. Fact-checking organizations and traditional media played a crucial role in debunking false information during the South African elections. However, with Meta’s decision to discontinue third-party fact-checking, this vital safeguard is under threat. Furthermore, the increasing sophistication of disinformation tactics, coupled with the rise of artificial intelligence, will make these campaigns harder to detect and counter. The shift towards smaller, more localized networks like WhatsApp presents an additional challenge.
The ISS research also highlights the geopolitical dimension of online influence operations in Africa. The continent is increasingly becoming a contested space for competing narratives and agendas. The study noted the involvement of American right-wing groups in influence campaigns, demonstrating the expanding scope of these operations. The incident involving Elon Musk’s false claims about land expropriation in South Africa, while potentially a clumsy attempt to justify US aid cuts, underscores the vulnerability of African nations to manipulation by external actors.
In response to these challenges, the ISS study calls for greater responsibility from tech platforms in regulating the content they publish. However, the prospects for effective regulation remain uncertain, particularly in light of political resistance to government oversight of social media. Concerted lobbying by African leaders and their European allies is crucial to pressure tech giants to adapt their policies to address the specific contexts in which disinformation thrives.
Furthermore, targeted digital literacy training is essential to equip citizens, journalists, and civil society organizations with the skills to identify and resist disinformation campaigns. Educating these groups can prevent them from inadvertently becoming "unwitting foot soldiers" in the spread of misinformation. Learning from the cybercrime community, where private sector initiatives have raised awareness about online threats, could offer valuable lessons for developing effective countermeasures.
In conclusion, the ISS study reveals a complex and evolving disinformation landscape in Africa, characterized by the rise of local influencer networks and their increasing involvement in transnational campaigns. Addressing this threat requires a multifaceted approach, including greater transparency and accountability from tech platforms, robust fact-checking mechanisms, targeted digital literacy training, and concerted international cooperation. Protecting the integrity of democratic processes in Africa demands urgent action to counter the insidious spread of disinformation.