Russian Disinformation Machine Turns France into a Primary Target Ahead of 2027 Presidential Election
France has become the second-largest target in the world for Russian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), according to the latest assessments from European security services. In a sweeping report published by the European External Action Service in March 2026, France recorded 107 large-scale information attacks in 2025, placing it just behind Ukraine, which experienced 112 such incidents. This extraordinary level of hostile activity signals a coordinated, systematic effort by the Kremlin to weaken French institutions, discredit leading political figures, and shape the outcome of the 2027 presidential election. The French presidential vote is scheduled for April 18, 2027, with a potential second round on May 2. President Emmanuel Macron, having already served two terms, is constitutionally barred from seeking a third, which has created a wide-open political contest and an inviting target for foreign interference. The Center for Strategic Communications, which analyzed the first officially documented incidents of Russian disinformation campaigns, identified three major operation networks operating in France: Storm-1516, Matryoshka, and Portal Kombat. These operations have already begun targeting potential successors to Macron, including former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, former Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, and Member of the European Parliament Raphaël Glucksmann. The attacks are not random; they appear deliberately calibrated to exploit vulnerabilities in the French political system, amplify social divisions, and undermine public faith in the electoral process before a single ballot is cast. France’s prominent leadership role in supporting Ukraine is believed to be the primary reason for this intense targeting. As the Kremlin seeks to reduce European support for Kyiv and fracture Western unity, French democracy has become a frontline battleground in a broader hybrid war that blends espionage, cyberattacks, and information manipulation with conventional military aggression.
Among the most serious incidents documented so far is the disinformation campaign mounted by Storm-1516, a Russian network known for fabricating deepfakes, staged videos, and false testimony. One of its first targets was Édouard Philippe, the former Prime Minister, Mayor of Le Havre, and declared candidate for the 2027 presidential election. Russian-aligned actors circulated false information about Philippe’s health in an apparent attempt to cast doubt on his fitness for office and to destabilize his campaign at an early stage. The same network then targeted Raphaël Glucksmann, a prominent French politician and Member of the European Parliament considered a potential contender in the presidential race. A junk website designed to look like the online news outlet Blast published a fabricated story claiming that Glucksmann’s wife was trying to bribe media outlets to create a positive image of her husband ahead of the election. The site also impersonated French journalists and presented forged documents as authentic evidence. In addition, a separate operation, known as Matryoshka, targeted Gabriel Attal, another former French prime minister viewed as a rising political figure. Materials presented as publications by reputable French media outlets, including Le Figaro and Libération, began circulating online, often using fake logos and visual styles to deceive readers. Some of these fabricated articles questioned Attal’s health, with headlines falsely claiming he had been hospitalized or that he suffered from Parkinson’s disease. Other stories alleged that Attal had paid media outlets to spread disinformation about him, and even that he was considering staging an assassination attempt and blaming Russia for it. These claims, while clearly absurd to careful observers, were designed to manipulate emotional responses, create confusion, and erode public trust in the integrity of political candidates. The use of deepfake technology and cloned media brands represents a dangerous escalation in information warfare, because it blurs the line between verifiable fact and malicious invention, making it difficult for ordinary voters to distinguish credible reporting from state-sponsored propaganda.
Beyond individual candidates, Russian information operations are actively seeking to undermine the electoral process itself and to delegitimize the institutional safeguards that protect French democracy. The Center for Strategic Communications’ analysis of the French information space found that the Portal Kombat operation, particularly its network of Pravda websites, plays a central role in this effort. Sites operating under domains such as francais.news-pravda.com and fr.news-pravda.com function as mass automated content amplifiers, disseminating hundreds of stories designed to paint French authorities as unaccountable, corrupt, and hostile to the interests of ordinary people. A central narrative promoted by these outlets is the portrayal of Viginum, France’s official institution responsible for monitoring foreign digital interference, as an instrument of total control and censorship. This is a deliberate attempt to preemptively delegitimize any official warnings about Russian meddling by framing them as government propaganda. The underlying goal is to create the necessary conditions for claiming that the upcoming election will be rigged by the authorities. If Viginum reports interference, Russian actors can dismiss it as evidence of state manipulation. If the election results are unfavorable to Kremlin interests, the same narrative can be used to question their legitimacy. This technique of preemptive delegitimization is a hallmark of modern information warfare, designed to ensure that even the most transparent and well-documented electoral process is perceived as tainted. The same operation also promotes themes aimed at polarizing French society ahead of the 2027 vote. Among the most prominent are claims that France has lost its sovereignty and is subordinate to the United States, and that the only option for the next president is to leave NATO and restore friendly relations with Russia. These narratives are not merely fringe opinions; they are systematically amplified across social media platforms, websites, and messaging applications to create the impression of broad public support where none exists.
A particularly concerning aspect of the Russian campaign is its focus on undermining trust in French state institutions as a whole. An analysis of the French-language information environment reveals a systematic and coordinated effort to depict government institutions as corrupt, secretive, and acting in the interests of narrow elites at the expense of the people. Russian and pro-Russian outlets frequently publish conspiracy theories alleging that officials are systematically withholding the truth from the public, especially regarding matters of national security, economic policy, and public health. Another distinct line of attack involves the deliberate creation of moral panic through the manipulation of LGBT and gender-related issues. Fabricated stories and distorted depictions of social debates are used to inflame cultural tensions and deepen divisions within French society. The overarching purpose is to create a sense that official institutions and the media are concealing important truths, thereby undermining their legitimacy and steering audiences toward the conclusion that there has been a betrayal by the ruling class. In addition to these domestic attacks, the same outlets systematically promote anti-Euro-Atlantic narratives designed to undermine the European Union and NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance and European institutions are portrayed as sources of lost sovereignty, economic harm, and reckless military escalation, while defense spending is presented as a burden that comes directly at the expense of citizens’ well-being. These narratives converge on a single strategic objective: to comprehensively weaken France’s internal resilience, erode a common European identity, and create favorable conditions for the gradual dismantling of the European Union from within. By amplifying genuine grievances and mixing them with fabricated accusations, the Kremlin aims to radicalize public opinion and push French politics toward nationalist, isolationist, and anti-Western positions that align more closely with Russian strategic interests.
The platforms used for these operations demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the modern information ecosystem and a strategic shift away from overt state-controlled media toward covert, difficult-to-attribute channels. According to the Center for Strategic Communications, websites belonging to the Pravda network predominate among web-based content, accounting for 49.8% of all publications analyzed. Telegram, which has become an increasingly important platform for political communication and propaganda distribution, accounts for 47.4% of all publications promoting these narratives. The combined dominance of these two channels means that the vast majority of hostile information directed at French audiences now flows through platforms with limited regulatory oversight, where automated accounts and anonymous channels can spread content rapidly before moderators or fact-checkers are able to respond. Official Russian propaganda outlets, including Sputnik Afrique, RT en français, and TASS, were also identified in the monitoring conducted by the Center, although to a lesser extent. This trend may be explained by attempts to conduct covert interference through anonymous sources and unaffiliated outlets in order to avoid direct attribution to the Russian state. By maintaining a lower profile for official state media, Moscow can preserve a veneer of deniability and reduce the likelihood of targeted sanctions or diplomatic consequences. At the same time, the use of automated amplification networks ensures that the disinformation reaches a wide audience without requiring enormous financial investment. The Pravda websites, for example, are not sophisticated sources of original journalism; they are content farms that repackage propaganda messages in localized formats, often using artificial intelligence and automated translation tools to adapt Russian talking points for French-speaking audiences. This hybrid approach, combining official propaganda with covert anonymous operations, makes it extraordinarily difficult for social media platforms, governments, and civil society organizations to detect interference, attribute responsibility, and take effective countermeasures.
France has begun to respond to this multifaceted threat, but the effectiveness of these efforts remains uncertain. Gabriel Attal, after becoming the target of deepfake videos and fabricated media reports, filed a formal complaint and publicly identified the attacks as foreign interference originating from Russian networks. His case was brought to his attention by France’s General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) and its Viginum unit, which is responsible for detecting and protecting against foreign digital interference. In August 2026, the Paris prosecutor’s office announced that it had launched a formal investigation into possible Russian interference in the 2027 presidential election, with the investigation currently concentrating on the campaigns of Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal. These actions demonstrate growing awareness within the French state of the severity of the threat, but they also highlight the asymmetry of the conflict. Russian operations can be conducted at relatively low cost, using anonymous accounts, automated bot networks, and foreign-based infrastructure, while French authorities must operate within strict legal frameworks, respect due process, and avoid infringing on civil liberties. The documented incidents indicate that Russia’s information interference in France’s domestic political processes has entered a phase of systematic preparation for the 2027 presidential campaign. The Kremlin is not relying on isolated information operations; it is employing complex infrastructure networks and hybrid methods that combine cyber operations, financial influence, and social media manipulation. The targeting of specific candidates, the deliberate demonization of democratic institutions, and the promotion of narratives centered on lost sovereignty and the need to exit NATO all point to a long-term strategy rather than opportunistic meddling. Ultimately, the Russian disinformation machine seeks not merely to influence the choices of French voters, but to fundamentally reshape the political environment in which those choices are made. By preemptively delegitimizing election results, eroding public trust in institutions, and pressuring the next president to reconsider France’s foreign policy course—particularly its support for Ukraine—the Kremlin hopes to achieve through information warfare what it cannot achieve through conventional military means. The response from the Paris prosecutor’s office, the SGDSN investigation, and the complaints filed by targeted politicians demonstrate that this constitutes a direct threat and an immediate challenge to France’s national security. As the 2027 election approaches, the battle for the integrity of French democracy is likely to intensify, and the ability of French institutions to defend against these invisible attacks will be tested as never before.
