Many Pretoria residents will not have to search for election information in the coming months; it will arrive before they have even thought to look. A family WhatsApp group, a Facebook post, a TikTok clip or a message forwarded by a neighbour can carry political content directly into a person’s phone. Some of this material will be shared by individuals who genuinely believe it is true. Other content, however, will be deliberately produced or distributed to mislead voters. With South Africa’s 2026 local government elections on the horizon, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has introduced an electoral code of conduct aimed at countering disinformation. The code establishes rules for political parties, candidates and anyone acting on their behalf when communicating with voters through both online and offline channels. Its purpose is to support election integrity and to contribute to free, fair and orderly elections. It applies from its promulgation on September 4 until the declaration of election results. For residents, being able to tell misinformation from disinformation is one of the most useful tools when confronted with questionable content. Misinformation is false or inaccurate information shared without an intention to deceive. For example, a resident might accidentally forward an incorrect voting date to a WhatsApp group because they genuinely believed that date was right. Disinformation, by contrast, is false or misleading information that is deliberately created or shared to deceive, cause harm or influence the way people understand an issue. The IEC has described election disinformation as false or misleading information shared by someone who knows it is untrue, or who has no reasonable basis for believing it is true, with the intention of misleading voters or disrupting an election. That difference in intention matters, but it does not change the risk: both types of content can spread rapidly and leave residents unsure of what they can trust.
According to the IEC, residents should be particularly cautious about posts that make claims about voting dates, voting times, voting stations, registration requirements or who is eligible to vote. These are the sorts of details that can quietly suppress voter participation if false information circulates at the wrong moment. A single inaccurate message about a changed voting station could send someone to the wrong place, make them miss their opportunity to cast a ballot and create a lasting impression that the electoral system cannot be trusted. Residents are also urged to treat fake statements or announcements attributed to the IEC or its officials with suspicion, and to check them against the commission’s official communication channels. Another warning sign is an account that appears to be newly created or that has no meaningful footprint, as such accounts are often used to push false narratives. The code draws attention to coordinated networks of accounts or automated bots designed to make a political view look more popular than it really is. Political advertising that does not clearly identify who paid for or distributed it is also suspect. Beyond these common techniques, the code specifically addresses doxxing, a practice in which someone’s private information is shared without consent in order to cause harm. There is also growing concern about AI-generated or manipulated images, videos and audio. Under the code, synthetic content used by political parties and candidates must be clearly labelled before it is distributed. For residents watching such content, certain signs can raise suspicion, such as unusual facial movements, unnatural lighting, distorted hands or blurred edges, but the IEC cautions that these signs alone cannot confirm that something was generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence. The absence of visible flaws is not proof that content is real, and the presence of flaws is not proof that it is fake. That means residents should develop the habit of looking beyond the surface of an image or video and paying attention to context, source and consistency with official information.
The safest first step for any resident who encounters a suspicious political message is to pause before sharing. A single click can spread misinformation or disinformation across several platforms and give it a false sense of credibility. Once a forwarded message has moved through multiple community groups, it becomes extremely difficult for ordinary readers to tell where it began. Residents should therefore check where the information originated, whether the account that posted it is genuine, and whether the claim appears on official IEC platforms or is supported by credible news organisations. If a post claims the IEC has changed a voting date or a voting station, the only reliable response is to verify it directly through the commission rather than relying on a forwarded message. This small act of verification can prevent a false story from entering a family group, a church chat or a street WhatsApp community. Another useful technique is a reverse-image search. Free tools such as Google Images and TinEye allow users to upload or paste a photograph and see where else it has appeared on the internet. This can be particularly valuable when an old photograph from another event or location is presented as a current incident in Pretoria. For example, a picture of a crowd, a sign or a damaged building taken years ago could be recirculated as if it were evidence of something happening today. The result is a false impression that can stoke tension or distrust, even if no words have been manipulated. By spending a minute checking the source of an image, residents can avoid repeating that mistake. The IEC’s guidance also encourages residents to be alert to content that triggers strong emotions. Disinformation often works by producing anger, fear or outrage, prompting people to share before they think. A message that feels designed to provoke an emotional response should be treated with extra caution. Residents should also remember that political parties and candidates are required to correct false or misleading information they have spread. If a party becomes aware that it has distributed inaccurate content, it must publicly retract and correct it within 36 hours and, where appropriate, censure those responsible. That means residents who see a correction are not witnessing a scandal; they are seeing the code in action.
Political parties and candidates, as well as those acting on their behalf, are not simply bystanders in the fight against disinformation. The electoral code obliges them to check information for accuracy before distributing it and to take responsibility for content published by them, for them or on their behalf. This includes messages produced by volunteers, digital campaign teams and social media influencers who are paid or used by a party. If a party or candidate becomes aware that they have distributed false or misleading information, they have a duty to publicly retract and correct it within 36 hours and, where appropriate, discipline those responsible. The code also contains a list of prohibited practices. Fake accounts are explicitly banned, as are bot networks and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Doxxing and cyberbullying are also designated as deceptive practices that cannot be used in campaigns. Parties and candidates must report instances of online election disinformation to the Real411 platform within 36 hours of becoming aware of them. They are also expected to promote awareness of the code among their own members and supporters, ensuring that people who campaign on a party’s behalf understand the standard of behaviour required. In addition, the code prohibits disinformation targeting the IEC, its commissioners or its staff. This is a significant protection because disinformation that undermines the election commission itself can have a chilling effect on voter confidence. When false claims about the commission circulate, parties are required to publicly correct such information where it occurs. These obligations reflect a broader principle: that the duty of care in electoral communication lies not only with the platforms or with ordinary voters, but with the political actors who are in the strongest position to prevent harm before it happens. The code is designed to create accountability, but it remains largely dependent on political goodwill and on residents who are willing to take the time to report suspicious content. That is where the public’s role becomes important, because even the strongest enforcement system needs citizens to point out what has gone wrong.
To make reporting simple, the IEC has designated Real411 as the official platform for election-related disinformation complaints. The complaints process allows anyone to submit suspected digital harms for the Digital Complaints Committee to assess. Residents who wish to report content should provide supporting information, such as a link or screenshot of the content and details about where and when they encountered it. This helps the committee investigate claims swiftly and understand whether the content is part of a larger pattern. Complaints cannot be submitted anonymously, but the complainant’s identity is kept confidential throughout the complaint process, protecting members of the public who may be worried about reprisals. A complaint can be submitted through the Real411 complaints portal, and the process can end in several ways. A matter may be reviewed, referred to another body or addressed through other appropriate measures that may be considered appropriate in the circumstances. Election-related complaints are shared with the IEC’s Directorate for Electoral Offences, which is responsible for investigating possible breaches of electoral law. At the same time, independent outcomes from the Real411 process are submitted to the IEC for consideration. This two-channel approach means that a single complaint can serve both a public education function and a possible investigative function. It is worth noting that the goal is not to discourage political debate or legitimate criticism. The processes are meant to help residents distinguish between genuine political discussion and content that may deliberately mislead them. People should still be free to argue, challenge, campaign and criticise. What is not protected is the deliberate fabrication or manipulation of information in ways that undermine an election. The code recognises that healthy democracies depend on voters making choices on the basis of reliable information, and that when the information environment becomes polluted, every resident suffers. The IEC’s emphasis on reporting is therefore not a message of suspicion; it is an invitation for the public to become active guardians of electoral integrity.
Ultimately, the introduction of the code is a recognition that election disinformation is no longer an abstract risk but a practical challenge that reaches into every community in Pretoria and beyond. The power of a false message lies in its speed and reach. In the past, a rumour might have remained confined to a street corner; today it can travel through family and neighbourhood networks within minutes. That is why the IEC’s new code emphasises responsibility and verification at every level. Political parties must behave honestly, residents must pause and check, and platforms are expected to play their part in exposing harmful content. For Pretoria residents, the approach can be boiled down into a few practical habits: read before sharing, verify before accepting, and report when something looks wrong. When a message arrives in a family WhatsApp group claiming that a voting station has moved or that the election date has changed, the responsible reaction is not to forward it but to check it. When an image appears to show a shocking scene that supports a political narrative, the wise response is to ask whether the image is real, current and accurately described. The new code will not undo every piece of disinformation, and no code can guarantee that people will not be fooled. But it creates a framework in which lies can be challenged, corrections can be issued, and accounts that intentionally abuse the electoral process can be held to account. For ordinary voters, the most powerful takeaway is perhaps this: the distinction between misinformation and disinformation may be subtle, but the response to both should be the same — verify before you share. By taking that simple step, Pretoria residents can help protect not only themselves but also the integrity of the 2026 local government elections. The information landscape may be noisy, but a cautious and informed electorate is still the best defence against those who would try to manipulate democracy. Leaders, parties and candidates have a duty to keep their campaigns clean, but voters themselves are not passive consumers. They are the first line of verification, the witnesses who can flag harmful content and the audience that decides whether a lie is allowed to spread. The IEC has supplied the rules and the reporting tool; the rest depends on the choices that residents make every time they pick up their phones. It is a shared responsibility, and the coming election will be a test not only of the country’s democratic systems but also of the public’s willingness to defend them.
