IEC cracks down on disinformation ahead of South Africa’s local government elections
As South Africa prepares for the upcoming local government elections, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has taken a significant step to protect the integrity of the electoral process by gazetting a new code of conduct aimed at curbing the spread of false information online. The code, which applies to political parties and candidates, requires them to verify claims before sharing them publicly, correct any false or misleading information within 36 hours of becoming aware of it, and report instances of online disinformation to the relevant authorities. In addition to these obligations, the rules explicitly target fake accounts, bots, and what the IEC describes as “coordinated manipulation of social media.” This move comes amid growing concern about the role of digital platforms in shaping public opinion and the vulnerability of democratic processes to organised misinformation campaigns. The IEC’s intervention reflects a broader global trend in which electoral management bodies are increasingly being forced to respond to the challenges posed by the digital information ecosystem. With local government elections often decided by narrow margins and voter turnout heavily influenced by perceptions of credibility and trust, the commission’s efforts are aimed at ensuring that the online space does not become a weaponised environment for deception. The code is legally binding for signatories, and its inclusion in the electoral framework means that parties and candidates can be held accountable for breaches, potentially facing penalties or other legal consequences. However, the success of these measures will depend not only on enforcement but also on the willingness of political actors to embrace a culture of responsibility and transparency in their communications.
Understanding the distinction between disinformation and misinformation is central to grasping the significance of the IEC’s new regulations. According to Kyle Findlay, a social media researcher and co-founder of Murmur, the two terms are often confused but describe different phenomena. “Disinformation is obvious lies. It’s when the person posting it knows that they’re posting something misleading,” Findlay explained. “Misinformation is when something misleading is shared, but perhaps unintentionally.” This distinction matters because it determines intent, which in turn influences how the problem should be addressed. Disinformation is deliberately crafted to deceive, often with the goal of manipulating public opinion, sowing division, or undermining trust in institutions. Misinformation, on the other hand, can spread organically when people share content they believe to be true but which is actually false. The IEC’s code of conduct appears to recognise both forms, by requiring parties and candidates to check claims before sharing them, thereby reducing the likelihood of unintentionally amplifying falsehoods, and by obliging them to correct false or misleading information promptly. The 36-hour correction window is particularly notable, as it imposes a clear timeline for accountability. This is especially important in the fast-moving world of social media, where false narratives can gain traction within minutes and become deeply entrenched before corrections are issued. By forcing political actors to act quickly, the code seeks to limit the damage caused by viral misinformation. Yet Findlay’s distinction also highlights the difficulty of regulating intent. Proving that someone knowingly shared false information can be challenging, and the line between reckless disregard for truth and deliberate deception is often blurred. Nonetheless, the IEC’s attempt to codify these responsibilities signals a growing recognition that political communication cannot be left entirely to self-regulation.
One of the most concerning aspects of the South African online political landscape, according to Findlay, is the existence of a well-established black market for paid influence. “We have a very established black market for paid influence where political parties and brands and anyone can go and buy engagement,” he said. This practice involves purchasing likes, shares, comments, followers, and other forms of social media engagement to create the appearance of widespread support for a particular message, candidate, or party. Such tactics are not unique to South Africa, but they have become increasingly sophisticated and accessible, with services available at low cost on various online platforms. The danger, Findlay explained, is that these deliberate campaigns can create the illusion that a political message has more public support than it really does. “You can create the illusion that there is consensus or groundswell support for an idea,” he said. This is particularly damaging in a democratic context, because it distorts the perception of public opinion and can influence undecided voters, media coverage, and even the internal dynamics of political parties. When a political party appears to be gaining momentum online, journalists and voters alike may take notice, and the narrative of inevitability can become self-fulfilling. The IEC’s new rules, which target fake accounts, bots, and coordinated manipulation, are a direct response to this phenomenon. By prohibiting these practices, the commission is attempting to level the playing field and ensure that online engagement reflects genuine public sentiment rather than manufactured support. However, the enforcement of such rules is fraught with difficulty. Detecting coordinated inauthentic behaviour requires sophisticated monitoring tools and cross-platform cooperation, which are not always available to electoral authorities. Moreover, the anonymous nature of many online accounts makes it difficult to attribute responsibility, and political actors may seek to distance themselves from the activities of unofficial supporters or third-party operatives. Nevertheless, the IEC’s willingness to address the issue head-on is an important step in the right direction.
Beyond the deliberate manipulation of social media, Findlay highlighted a deeper cognitive challenge that affects all social media users. “None of us are immune to it. We are all scrolling through our phones. We’re all making judgment calls based on very small, decontextualised pieces of information all the time,” he said. This observation speaks to the fundamental nature of social media platforms, which are designed to deliver short, attention-grabbing content rather than nuanced, contextual information. A headline, a meme, or a short video clip can shape our perception of a complex issue in an instant, and the emotional response it triggers often determines whether we share it with others. Findlay suggested that emotionally charged posts, particularly those that blame whole groups of people for something, should make us pause before hitting the share button. Such content is often designed to provoke outrage, fear, or resentment, and it is precisely these emotions that can override our critical thinking faculties. In the context of an election, this can have serious consequences. Voters may form opinions based on misleading or incomplete information, and political parties may exploit these emotional triggers to mobilise support or suppress turnout among opponents. The IEC’s code of conduct, by requiring parties and candidates to check claims before sharing them, implicitly acknowledges the power of emotional content and the need for greater responsibility among political communicators. However, the code does not directly address the behaviour of ordinary citizens, who are often the primary vectors of misinformation. This is where media literacy becomes crucial. If voters are equipped with the skills to evaluate sources, verify claims, and recognise emotional manipulation, they may be less susceptible to the influence of both disinformation and misinformation. Findlay’s comments suggest that the problem is not merely technological or regulatory, but deeply human. Our cognitive biases, our tendency to seek confirmation of our existing beliefs, and our susceptibility to emotionally resonant narratives all make us vulnerable to manipulation. Recognising this vulnerability is the first step towards addressing it, both individually and collectively.
The IEC’s new code of conduct could, at the very least, force parties and candidates to think twice about what they post online. Findlay expressed cautious optimism about this possibility, noting that in any political landscape, there are cynical populist politicians who will say whatever they need to say to get votes. “The truth is often a casualty in those kinds of scenarios,” he said. “And so they’re trying to hold those kinds of cynical politicians to account.” The code represents an attempt to introduce a measure of accountability into a space that has often been characterised by impunity. By making parties and candidates formally responsible for the accuracy of their online communications, the IEC is sending a clear signal that the electoral process cannot be treated as a free-for-all in which falsehoods are acceptable collateral damage. The requirement to correct false or misleading information within 36 hours is particularly significant, as it creates a mechanism for remedy. If a party makes a false claim, it must not only retract it but do so in a timely manner, thereby reducing the window in which the falsehood can influence voters. The obligation to report online disinformation also creates a channel for the IEC to become aware of emerging threats and to take action if necessary. However, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on the IEC’s capacity to monitor compliance and to impose meaningful sanctions for breaches. There are also questions about the scope of the code. Does it apply to all forms of online communication, including private messaging platforms? How will the IEC determine whether a claim is false or misleading, particularly in the context of political opinions and promises? These are complex issues that will likely be tested in practice. Nonetheless, the very existence of the code is a reminder that political communication is not exempt from ethical standards, and that the pursuit of electoral victory does not justify the deliberate spread of lies.
As South Africa heads towards the local government elections, the IEC’s move to regulate online political communication is both timely and necessary. The country has experienced the effects of disinformation and misinformation in previous elections, and the threat has only grown with the increasing use of social media as a primary source of news and information. The new code of conduct is a proactive attempt to mitigate this threat, but it cannot succeed in isolation. It requires the cooperation of political parties, candidates, social media platforms, and, ultimately, voters themselves. The distinction between disinformation and misinformation, as articulated by Kyle Findlay, reminds us that the problem is not monolithic. It involves both deliberate deception and unintentional error, and both require different responses. The IEC’s code addresses the former by imposing obligations on political actors, but the latter can only be addressed through education and awareness. Voters must learn to pause before sharing emotionally charged content, to seek out multiple sources, and to question the context of the information they encounter. Social media platforms also have a role to play, through content moderation, algorithmic transparency, and the promotion of authoritative information. The IEC’s rules are a step forward, but they are not a panacea. The integrity of elections depends on a healthy information ecosystem, and that is a shared responsibility. As the election campaign unfolds, the effectiveness of the code will be tested in real time. Will parties comply with the requirement to correct false information within 36 hours? Will they refrain from using fake accounts and bots to manufacture support? Will they report disinformation rather than quietly benefiting from it? These questions will determine whether the IEC’s intervention is a meaningful reform or merely a symbolic gesture. For now, the commission has made its intentions clear. The truth, it seems, is to be protected as a vital component of the democratic process. Whether that protection proves effective will depend on the collective commitment of all South Africans to value truth over manipulation, and to hold accountable those who seek to undermine the electoral process for their own gain. The local government elections are not just a test of political popularity; they are also a test of the country’s resilience against the corrosive effects of online disinformation. The IEC has laid down the rules. Now it is up to the parties, the candidates, and the voters to uphold them.
