By Anita Nkonki
Political parties and candidates will now have a strict 36-hour window to publicly retract and correct election-related disinformation once they become aware of it, or risk facing sanctions under South Africa’s electoral law. This is according to a new Electoral Code of Conduct introduced by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), which aims to close what the commission describes as a major gap in a legal framework developed long before the social media era. The IEC says the new rules are necessary because political campaigning increasingly takes place online, where false claims, manipulated content and fabricated material can spread rapidly and undermine the integrity of elections. Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Dr Victor Shale said the Commission was deeply concerned that the existing legal framework had failed to keep pace with the digital information environment. “The concern has been that the legal framework is inadequate in dealing with the pervasive use of digital and social media,” Shale said. “In particular, the electoral code of conduct did not have any reference to disinformation.” Under the new provisions, parties and candidates must act as soon as reasonably practicable—and no later than 36 hours after becoming aware—to publicly retract and correct disinformation or other false and misleading information that was disseminated by them, for them, or on their behalf. They must also publicly censure the person responsible for spreading the disinformation. The obligation goes beyond official party statements, extending to platforms and channels associated with political parties and candidates, meaning that parties must take reasonable steps to identify disinformation, including third-party user-generated content, and act quickly to correct it and limit its spread.
The urgency behind the new code stems from the fact that the existing Code of Conduct framework was developed in the 1990s, before social media became a dominant platform for political campaigning and public debate. Shale said this had created a significant gap in election management, leaving the IEC without adequate tools to respond to the realities of modern political communication. “The current code of conduct framework is outdated as it predates the social media era which, notwithstanding its positive attributes, entails disinformation and misinformation detrimental to election integrity,” he said. In recent years, disinformation has become a defining feature of elections around the world, including in South Africa. False narratives, manipulated images, deepfake videos and viral conspiracy theories have all been used to distort political competition, manipulate voters and attack the credibility of democratic institutions. The IEC’s new code is intended to address this directly by placing legal responsibility on political actors themselves to ensure that their campaigns do not become vehicles for harmful falsehoods. The code also demands that parties and candidates take responsibility for content generated by third parties that supports their campaigns, requiring proactive monitoring rather than passive denial. This represents a significant shift from previous practice, where parties often distanced themselves from damaging content produced by unofficial supporters or anonymous social media accounts. By emphasising accountability and rapid response, the IEC hopes to create a norm of corrective action that prevents disinformation from gaining traction before votes are cast.
Much of the new framework depends on compliance and enforcement. The code states that any contravention or failure to comply constitutes a breach and is subject to sanctions under the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act. In addition, parties and candidates must report instances of disinformation or suspected disinformation distributed through an online platform to the IEC’s designated complaints mechanism within 36 hours of becoming aware of it. The IEC has designated Real411 as the platform for this purpose, allowing members of the public and political stakeholders to lodge complaints about problematic online content quickly and efficiently. The requirement to report suspected disinformation is particularly important because it obliges political actors to act as co-regulators of the digital campaign space, rather than simply waiting for the IEC to intervene. Parties are also expected, where appropriate and within their control, to publicly condemn and appropriately sanction their own members or nominated candidates who contravene the law or the code. This internal accountability mechanism is designed to ensure that political parties do not shelter rogue operatives who engage in disinformation tactics. The code also introduces clear labelling requirements for online political advertising, which must be clearly associated with the relevant political party or candidate. Furthermore, AI-generated audio, images, video and text used for political purposes must be explicitly identified as “synthetic content” before distribution, a requirement that speaks directly to the growing threat of deepfakes and other sophisticated manipulation technologies in electoral campaigns.
The new code also prohibits the use of technologies or tools intended to amplify disinformation or manipulate political discourse. This includes fake accounts, automated bots, deceptive content, doxxing and the misuse of personal or sensitive information. These practices have become increasingly common in South African political campaigns, where social media platforms have been used to create the illusion of mass support, to harass journalists and opponents, and to spread targeted falsehoods to specific communities. Shale said the scale and speed of digital communication had fundamentally changed what was required to protect elections. “Procedural correctness which, hitherto the emergence of social media had been the most important pillar of election management, is no longer sufficient on its own,” he said. He argued that political competition in South Africa and elsewhere has directly contributed to the spread of disinformation, making it a systemic threat to electoral credibility. “If left unattended,” Shale warned, disinformation peddling could “derail the electoral process”. The IEC’s new framework is therefore intended to strengthen its ability to mitigate the harms associated with digital and social media in elections. Shale said the disinformation code ensures that the IEC is sufficiently equipped to protect the integrity of electoral processes while still allowing for robust political debate. The commission hopes that the code will deter political actors from using disinformation as a campaign strategy, while also providing a clear mechanism for correction when false content does emerge. By imposing strict timelines and explicit obligations, the IEC is signalling that disinformation can no longer be treated as an acceptable or minor aspect of political campaigning.
However, the new measures have also prompted cautions from human-rights bodies about unintended consequences. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has separately warned that efforts to tackle disinformation must not undermine fundamental rights, especially freedom of expression. In its Policy Brief on Information Integrity and Human Rights, the SAHRC said disinformation could no longer be treated simply as a communications or social-media problem. When false or manipulated information contributes to violence, discrimination, electoral disruption, attacks on vulnerable communities or the erosion of trust in democratic institutions, the commission said, it becomes a human-rights concern. This framing acknowledges the seriousness of the harm that disinformation can cause, while emphasising that any response must comply with constitutional values and international human-rights standards. The SAHRC cautioned that measures to counter disinformation must be lawful, necessary and proportionate and should not suppress legitimate dissent. “Freedom of expression remains fundamental,” the SAHRC said. This is a critical reminder that in seeking to clean up the digital campaign space, regulators must not create a chilling effect that silences criticism, satire, or genuine political discourse. The challenge lies in distinguishing between intentionally false and harmful content, on the one hand, and robust, albeit critical, political speech on the other. The SAHRC’s warning suggests that careful implementation and oversight will be essential to ensure that the code is not weaponised against political opponents or used to silence uncomfortable truths. The IEC has indicated that it will operate the new code with a focus on accountability and correction, but the practical application will be watched closely by political parties, civil society and media freedom organisations.
In the end, the new Electoral Code of Conduct represents a major attempt to modernise South Africa’s electoral framework in response to the realities of the digital age. The IEC’s bold move to impose a 36-hour retraction rule, require reporting of disinformation, ban deceptive amplification tools, and mandate labelling of synthetic content shows that electoral authorities are no longer willing to rely on traditional procedural mechanisms alone. As Shale argued, the disinformation code ensures that the IEC is sufficiently equipped to mitigate the harms that come with the use of social and digital media in South Africa’s elections. Yet the success of the framework will depend on a number of factors: the willingness of political parties to comply, the effectiveness of the Real411 complaints mechanism, the capacity of the IEC to investigate and sanction breaches, and the broader legal and political culture in which the code operates. The balance between protecting electoral integrity and safeguarding freedom of expression will require constant vigilance. The SAHRC’s intervention is a timely reminder that any solution must not create new inequalities or silence legitimate voices. As South Africa moves towards its next elections, the new code sends a clear message that disinformation is a serious threat to democracy and that political actors will be held accountable for their role in spreading it. In an era of deepfakes, bots and viral falsehoods, the need for such rules has never been greater. With this framework, the IEC is attempting to strike a delicate balance: allowing robust digital campaigning while ensuring that lies cannot determine the outcome of elections. Whether it succeeds will depend on rigorous enforcement, cooperation from platforms and parties, and respect for constitutional rights. The stakes could not be higher, as the credibility of South Africa’s democratic process hangs in the balance.
