Here is the summary of the report, structured into six paragraphs:
A recent investigation by Democracy Reporting International has uncovered a sophisticated network of 19 Telegram channels masquerading as independent local news outlets. While these channels appear to operate autonomously, they are part of a coordinated effort—dubbed the “Common Sense network”—to disseminate content aligned with Kremlin-backed narratives across 19 different languages. Although seven of these channels were previously identified by researchers, the addition of 12 new entities reveals a broader, more persistent infrastructure designed to influence public opinion under the guise of grassroots journalism.
The mechanics of this network are characterized by strategic obfuscation and artificial amplification. The channels utilize nearly identical branding and naming conventions, yet they maintain a deliberate lack of public connectivity to avoid detection. Researchers observed that content is published in highly coordinated patterns, often accompanied by suspicious spikes in subscriber numbers. These rapid fluctuations, which saw the network’s reach swell to over 220,000 subscribers before dropping below 100,000, strongly suggest the use of inauthentic or purchased accounts to simulate popularity and build artificial credibility.
A central point of concern emerging from the research is the platform’s regulatory status under the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA). Currently, Telegram reports having fewer than 45 million monthly active users in the EU, a threshold that exempts it from being classified as a “Very Large Online Platform” (VLOP). This designation is critical, as VLOPs are subject to rigorous systemic risk assessments and must actively mitigate coordinated manipulation efforts. By remaining beneath this threshold, Telegram avoids the most stringent oversight requirements, leaving a significant gap in the enforcement of digital safety standards.
The researchers at Democracy Reporting International have called for an immediate and rigorous audit of how Telegram calculates its audience figures. The current methodology is a point of contention, particularly because Telegram allows users to view public content without formal subscriptions. Critics argue that this loophole may lead to an undercounting of the platform’s true influence and reach within the EU. While the European Commission has confirmed it is monitoring the situation and remains in dialogue with national authorities, there is mounting pressure to ensure that the platform’s self-reported data accurately reflects its real-world impact.
The influence of this network is not confined to Telegram; researchers tracked the migration of these Kremlin-aligned narratives onto major mainstream platforms, including Facebook, X, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok. Although the study did not definitively prove a coordinated cross-platform posting strategy, the ease with which these narratives flow between Telegram and more strictly regulated environments suggests a highly effective “spillover” effect. This allows the network to bypass individual platform safeguards, effectively reaching diverse audiences across the digital ecosystem while evading the regulatory hurdles meant to curb disinformation.
Ultimately, this case study highlights a significant vulnerability in the current digital regulatory framework. It demonstrates how actors can weaponize the appearance of “trusted local media” to distribute propaganda while operating in the regulatory shadows of the DSA. The incident raises urgent questions regarding the accountability of platforms that facilitate such networks, emphasizing that as long as reporting requirements remain opaque and systemic risk mitigation remains limited, coordinated influence operations will continue to exploit these gray areas to manipulate public discourse at scale.