QUITO, Ecuador — A coordinated disinformation campaign impersonated eight of Ecuador’s most recognizable news outlets on the social media platform X between July 31 and August 11, 2026, using between 60 and 90 accounts to publish manipulated content in two successive waves, according to an investigation by Ecuador Chequea published on August 11. The operation copied the logos, typography and editorial formats of Primicias, Ecuavisa (including Ecuavisa Play), El Comercio, Radio Pichincha, TC Televisión, Teleamazonas, Radio Centro and La Hora, creating posts that were deliberately designed to appear as if they had been produced by real journalists. Ecuador Chequea, a fact-checking organization that monitors disinformation, did not publicly identify the individuals or groups responsible, but it detailed a pattern of coordinated, politically themed activity that unfolded during moments of high national tension. The findings were later summarized by Voces del Sur, which highlighted the investigation as evidence of a growing threat to the country’s information ecosystem. The report is especially significant because it shows that impersonation has become a repeat tactic in Ecuador, not an isolated mistake. By exploiting the visual identity of trusted media brands, the campaign sought to place political propaganda inside the packaging of legitimate journalism, making it far more difficult for ordinary citizens to separate reliable reporting from manufactured content. The choice of target outlets was broad, spanning digital-native newsrooms, major television networks, and influential radio stations, suggesting a deliberate effort to saturate every corner of Ecuador’s media landscape.
The first wave was organized under the hashtag #ChaoCorreismo, a phrase that, according to Ecuador Chequea, had been inactive until the operation began. The campaign started on July 31, then intensified sharply on August 3 and 4, coinciding with a ruling by the Criminal Guarantees Court that sentenced Guayaquil Mayor Aquiles Álvarez to three years in prison for failing to comply with electronic monitoring requirements in a case known as “Grillete.” Álvarez is a prominent political figure, and the court’s decision immediately became a subject of intense partisan debate in Ecuador. The hashtag, roughly translating as “Goodbye, Correismo,” was used to frame the sentencing as a political defeat for the movement associated with former President Rafael Correa. The fact that the hashtag had been dormant before the operation suggests that the accounts did not simply join an existing conversation; instead, they activated a topic and supplied it with content designed to look like news coverage. By publishing in the visual style of established outlets such as El Comercio and Teleamazonas, the accounts were able to present interpretations of the court ruling as though they were verified reports or editorials from respected media organizations. The timing was precise: the first posts appeared before the verdict could be thoroughly digested by the public, giving the disinformation network an early chance to shape the narrative. The result was a particularly dangerous mix of real legal developments, partisan slogans, and counterfeit journalistic formats.
The second wave began on August 10 under the hashtag #AQuitoYaNoLoEspian, one day after the national government announced that the Interior Ministry would take control of between 632 and 800 cameras belonging to Quito’s Strategic Command Center. That announcement raised questions about surveillance, government control over local security infrastructure, and the potential use of cameras for political monitoring. President Daniel Noboa responded to criticism by saying that the state was “taking control of video surveillance … not spy networks.” The fake media accounts used this controversy as the backdrop for a new round of disinformation, again employing the logos and editorial layouts of Ecuadorian news outlets. The slogan #AQuitoYaNoLoEspian — roughly “Quito is no longer spied on” — echoed Noboa’s framing and sought to present the camera takeover as a liberation from espionage rather than as a concentration of government power. This second wave demonstrates how the same infrastructure and techniques can be adapted to different political narratives. In both cases, the hashtags served as coordinating signals, while the impersonated media brands served as guarantees of credibility. Ecuador Chequea observed that the two waves were “successive,” meaning they did not overlap in a chaotic way but instead followed a logical sequence: first attacking the political opposition over the Álvarez sentence, then defending or amplifying the government’s position on the security camera dispute. The ability to switch messages quickly without abandoning the basic strategy points to a well-organized campaign rather than a spontaneous collection of social media users.
The methodological details of the investigation reveal a sophisticated operation. Ecuador Chequea identified between 60 and 90 accounts participating in the campaign, a number large enough to create the illusion of grassroots support but not so large that it would draw immediate attention. The accounts published content that copied not only logos but also typography, headline design, and editorial formats, meaning the fake posts reproduced the precise visual grammar of the news outlets. This attention to detail is significant because it makes detection much more difficult for a typical user scrolling through a timeline in a hurry. The affected outlets include some of the most established names in Ecuadorian media: Primicias is a leading digital news source; Ecuavisa and Teleamazonas are major broadcasters with large audiences; El Comercio is one of the country’s oldest and most respected newspapers; Radio Pichincha and Radio Centro are influential radio stations; and TC Televisión is a well-known channel. By targeting this mix of platforms, the campaign was able to exploit the full range of Ecuadorian media. The report also noted that this kind of appropriation has been documented repeatedly since 2024, indicating that the problem is ongoing and evolving. It is not simply a case of someone creating a parody account; it is a systematic attack on the visual and institutional markers that define professional journalism.
The consequences of such impersonation go far beyond a few misleading posts. As the statement from Ecuador Chequea emphasized, the systematic appropriation of media logos poses a risk to Ecuador’s information ecosystem. It erodes public trust in verified journalistic sources, because citizens cannot be certain that what they are seeing actually comes from the outlet whose name appears at the top. It makes it harder to distinguish genuine content from disinformation, since the very design elements used by real newsrooms to signal authenticity are being copied and weaponized. It also exposes affected media outlets to reputational damage without any editorial responsibility on their part. If a fabricated post, disguised as an article from El Comercio, contains a false accusation against a politician, the public may blame the newspaper rather than the anonymous creators of the post. Legal complaints, cancelations, or threats against journalists could follow, even though the outlet had nothing to do with the content. In a polarized society, these effects can be especially damaging. Disinformation networks exploit existing divisions, using counterfeit journalism to inflame emotions and deepen mistrust. The repetition of this tactic since 2024 means that Ecuadorian audiences are increasingly likely to question the authenticity of genuine reporting, which in turn weakens the ability of professional news organizations to fulfill their watchdog role.
The investigation by Ecuador Chequea, as highlighted by Voces del Sur, serves as both a warning and a call to action. Social media platforms, particularly X, must do more to identify and remove accounts that impersonate recognized news organizations. Verification systems, rapid takedown mechanisms, and cooperation with independent fact-checkers are essential tools in this fight. Ecuadorian media outlets themselves need to strengthen their digital defenses, registering their domains, protecting their brands, and communicating clearly with audiences about how to identify authentic content. Journalists and civil society organizations should continue to promote media literacy, teaching people to verify URLs, check official social media accounts, and be skeptical of suspicious posts even when they carry familiar logos. The original report, written in Spanish and translated with the assistance of artificial intelligence, did not offer a detailed policy roadmap, but it made clear that the threat is real, continuous, and increasingly professionalized. With political tensions running high in Ecuador, and with the country facing a complex security and electoral environment, the manipulation of media identities is likely to continue. The public’s ability to recognize and reject fake content disguised as journalism will be vital to safeguarding democratic debate. Ultimately, the cost of inaction is severe: a media environment in which citizens no longer know whom to trust, and in which political actors can use the credibility of independent journalism to spread lies with impunity. The facts uncovered by Ecuador Chequea deserve urgent attention from regulators, platforms, and the public, because the weapon is not a fake account alone — it is the trust that democracies place in honest reporting.
