Ethnic Disinformation Emerges as Major Threat Ahead of Nigeria’s 2027 Elections, Experts Warn

By: Nurudeen Akewushola, FactCheckHub

Abuja, Nigeria – Disinformation actors are increasingly exploiting Nigeria’s deep ethnic fault lines to spread false narratives, reinforce harmful stereotypes, and transform ordinary incidents into weapons for fuelling hostility between communities, a comprehensive fact-checking analysis has revealed. With millions of Nigerians consuming news and discussing politics on social media, a misleading photograph, an old video, or a fabricated claim can reach thousands of people within minutes. When such content is deliberately framed around ethnicity, its impact becomes particularly dangerous—not merely misleading the public about an event, but encouraging entire communities to view one another with suspicion, distrust, or outright hostility.

Nigeria, a multi-ethnic nation of more than 300 ethnic groups and over 500 languages, provides fertile ground for this form of information disorder. Ethnic disinformation—defined as the deliberate creation, manipulation, or dissemination of false or misleading information designed to influence how people perceive an ethnic group or to create hostility between ethnic communities—has the potential to deepen existing divisions that already threaten national cohesion. The practice takes multiple forms, often leveraging genuine media artifacts stripped of their original context. A genuine photograph may be given a false ethnic narrative; an old crime report may be presented as a recent incident; or the actions of a single individual may deliberately be portrayed as evidence of the behaviour of an entire ethnic group. These tactics are not random; they are systematically deployed across social media platforms to manipulate public perception and provoke emotional reactions that override rational judgment.

Recycled Media and Fabricated Narratives: The Tools of the Trade

The analysis, conducted by FactCheckHub, identified a pattern where social media accounts repeatedly recycle old news items, manipulate media reports, and use misleading visuals to portray rival ethnic groups negatively. For instance, a video showing a group of women holding tree branches and chanting “Igbo Must Go” resurfaced online in 2024 as though it depicted a recent event. However, FactCheckHub found that the video had been online for more than a year before the post in question was made, indicating that the content was deliberately reused to inflame tensions during a sensitive period. Similarly, another video that trended on social media claimed to show men from the Igbo ethnic group attacking an embassy in Dakar, Senegal. FactCheckHub traced the video and discovered it had been online since 2013 and actually depicted a completely different incident unrelated to Nigerian ethnic groups.

The same pattern applies to still images. A photograph does not have to be fake for the claim attached to it to be false. A real image can be taken from an old news report and paired with a new caption that changes its location, date, identities, or circumstances. For example, an image was widely shared with the claim that a Yoruba man had killed his sister for money rituals. FactCheckHub’s investigation, using reverse-image searches, established that the photograph actually originated from a murder incident in Ghana—completely unrelated to the Nigerian claims. This demonstrates that verifying whether an image is genuine is only the first step; users must also establish whether the caption accurately describes what the image actually shows.

Another common tactic is the presentation of extraordinary claims as “breaking news” without any identifiable source. These posts announce mass kidnappings, attacks, or government actions but provide no link to a credible news organisation, official statement, or verifiable source. In January 2025, an account on X (formerly Twitter) claimed that 50 people, including five Nigerian soldiers, had been kidnapped in Oyo State, and that a state of emergency had subsequently been declared across the South-West region. FactCheckHub archived the post and conducted checks, but found no credible media reports or official statements confirming the alleged kidnappings or the declaration of a state of emergency. The Public Relations Officer of the Nigeria Police Force, Oyo State Command, also officially debunked the claim, stating that no such incident had occurred.

Actors, Motivations, and the Threat to Democracy

The analysis further revealed that the spread of ethnic disinformation is not accidental but is driven by a range of actors with distinct motivations. Posts that repeatedly describe an entire ethnic group as criminals, ritualists, kidnappers, drug traffickers, or fraudsters should immediately attract scrutiny. The use of ethnic slurs is another warning sign; some accounts deliberately use derogatory terms while discussing issues, framing individual incidents as evidence of alleged criminal tendencies among an entire ethnic group. Such language is intended to provoke anger rather than provide useful information, and it often serves to mobilise supporters along identity lines.

Coordinated amplification is a key mechanism. Ethnic disinformation can sometimes be spread by networks of accounts rather than a single user. One account may publish a claim while others repost it, add inflammatory captions, or present the same allegation as independent confirmation. This repetition creates a false impression of credibility, making an unverified claim appear to be widely accepted fact. When the same claim suddenly appears across numerous accounts, users should question whether these are genuinely independent sources or simply a coordinated campaign. The history of the account publishing a claim can also provide important context—an account that repeatedly posts sensational crime stories involving one ethnic group, uses ethnic slurs, or publishes misleading content targeting the same community may be pushing a broader narrative rather than simply sharing an isolated falsehood. Checking previous posts can reveal patterns that are not obvious from a single viral post.

Speaking with FactCheckHub, Adejumo Kabir, a senior researcher at the Pan-African think tank Good Governance Africa, explained the motivations behind these tactics. “Their motivations could be to mobilise voters by creating an identity-based sense of threat. For online influencers, content that provokes anger, fear, or indignation tends to attract engagement, which can translate into followers and financial income. Once citizens begin to consume information primarily through ethnic or political identity, they become less likely to question information that confirms their existing beliefs,” Kabir said. He identified the beneficiaries as politicians, partisan supporters, influencers seeking engagement, coordinated online networks, and individuals pursuing selfish interests to deliberately destabilise communities.

The impact on Nigeria’s democracy is severe. The 2023 general elections marked a particularly intense period of ethnic and political disinformation. Political competition became increasingly framed in ethnic terms, particularly in the presidential contest between Peter Obi of the Labour Party and Bola Tinubu of the All Progressives Congress. Obi was repeatedly portrayed as sympathetic to the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a south-eastern separatist group, while narratives around Tinubu focused on his choice of Kashim Shettima, a Muslim, as his running mate and the perceived exclusion of particular ethnic or religious groups. In Lagos, Obi’s strong showing in the presidential election became the basis for narratives portraying Igbos as attempting to “take over” the state, leading to heightened ethnic hostility between Yoruba and Igbo communities. Ethnic tensions did not disappear after the elections; instead, some narratives evolved from direct election-related propaganda into broader attempts to portray rival communities as inherently dangerous or criminal.

Kabir warned of the longer-term governance implications. “There is also a longer-term governance implication. Democracy requires citizens to disagree without treating disagreement as a justification for hostility,” he said. He added that a second concern is electoral violence, particularly when fabricated videos or false reports of attacks circulate during periods of heightened tension. He further stressed that ethnic disinformation is dangerous because it promotes profiling and collective blame. “When an individual’s crime is attributed to an entire ethnic group, it creates an ‘us versus them’ mentality, deepens mistrust and reinforces stereotypes. Old or manipulated videos make this worse, as false narratives can spread widely before they are debunked. Unfortunately, many people may never see the correction. Such narratives will deepen social divisions and influence political choices through fear and identity rather than issues,” he explained.

Recommendations: A Multi-Stakeholder Response

Olatunji, a researcher with the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), also pointed to the need for strategic and strengthened partnerships among key stakeholders to combat ethnic-targeted disinformation in Nigeria. He highlighted the role of social media platforms in addressing the problem and stressed the need for algorithmic changes to curb the spread of harmful narratives while ensuring the effective implementation of robust content-moderation policies. According to Olatunji, these efforts should involve credible civil society organisations and fact-checkers that can provide cultural context and help identify problematic content. He also called on government agencies to take a more proactive approach to monitoring disinformation and, where appropriate, holding those responsible accountable. “Massive media literacy and community-based educational programmes need to be deployed as part of the public awareness campaigns against such disinformation narratives,” he concluded.

Looking ahead to the 2027 general elections, the threat is already materialising. With Nigeria heading towards another general election, some social media users have already begun spreading ethnic disinformation and hate speech, echoing patterns seen during the 2023 elections. As political activities gather pace, similar tactics could become more pronounced. The digital space is likely to remain a key battleground for political narratives, with misinformation, disinformation, and inflammatory content capable of fuelling ethnic tensions. The consequences of inaction are dire: without intervention, the 2027 election could be transformed from a contest over competing visions for Nigeria into one increasingly driven by identity, fear, and suspicion.

The burden of defence falls on multiple actors. Citizens must learn to recognise the red flags of ethnic disinformation—old media presented as new, extraordinary claims without sources, ethnic generalisations and slurs, coordinated amplification, and emotionally manipulative language. When a post makes you extremely angry, that is precisely when you should slow down. Ask yourself whether the post is providing evidence or simply trying to provoke an emotional reaction. Social media platforms must implement more effective content-moderation policies and adjust algorithms to demote harmful content. Civil society organisations and fact-checkers must expand their verification capacities and reach. Government agencies must monitor disinformation proactively and enforce accountability. Only through a concerted, multi-stakeholder effort can Nigeria safeguard its democratic integrity and social cohesion against the escalating threat of ethnic disinformation.