UK’s Cognitive Resilience Under Siege: The Urgent Need for a National Disinformation Defence Centre
The digital age has transformed information into a critical battleground, and the UK finds itself facing sophisticated adversaries who are already actively engaged in information warfare. The nation’s cognitive resilience – the ability of its citizens to critically assess information and resist manipulation – is under constant attack. To counter this escalating threat, the UK must draw upon the lessons learned from establishing the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and create a similarly robust and unified body to combat disinformation. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review has rightly identified disinformation as a primary threat, highlighting the urgent need for a ‘whole-of-society’ response to this insidious form of state-sponsored hybrid warfare. Currently, the fragmented nature of the UK’s approach leaves it vulnerable to exploitation.
The scale and sophistication of disinformation campaigns orchestrated by nation-states like Russia and China pose an unprecedented challenge. These adversaries have fully integrated information warfare into their national security strategies, treating it not as a peripheral activity, but as a central pillar of their geopolitical ambitions. As OpenAI’s June 2025 threat intelligence report reveals, these actors are increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) to amplify their disinformation efforts. The report documented cases of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors using AI to generate social media content, create fake personas, and manipulate online narratives at an alarming scale. These operations are no longer confined to fringe websites; they are infiltrating mainstream platforms and shaping public discourse.
The methods employed in these campaigns are evolving beyond easily detectable falsehoods. Rather than simply fabricating information, hostile actors now skillfully manipulate authentic content, amplifying carefully selected narratives to distort public perception. This sophisticated approach exploits the inherent biases of algorithmic systems, creating artificial echoes of public sentiment and influencing online trends. The scale of these operations dwarfs the capacity of traditional media regulators and intelligence agencies, rendering their existing tools and strategies insufficient. Russia’s reported investment of over $1 billion in ongoing disinformation campaigns targeting Western support for Ukraine underscores the magnitude of the challenge.
The UK’s current response to disinformation remains fragmented and ill-equipped to counter this multifaceted threat. While the Cabinet Office’s Chronic Risks Analysis has identified information warfare as a systemic risk to national stability, the practical response remains disjointed. Various government departments, civil society organizations, and private sector entities are involved, but their efforts lack coordination and a central authority. This lack of a unified front creates vulnerabilities that hostile actors readily exploit, as demonstrated by the 2024 Southport attacks and Summer Race Riots.
The events of 2024 highlighted the devastating consequences of a fractured response to disinformation. The rapid spread of false information following the tragic deaths of three young girls fueled nationwide riots within hours. The fragmented nature of the UK’s regulatory framework left key agencies powerless to effectively counter the surge of manipulated narratives. While one department grappled with platform regulation, another struggled with public messaging, and intelligence agencies tracked the specific threat actors. Crucially, no single entity possessed the mandate, resources, or authority to orchestrate a swift and comprehensive response.
To safeguard the UK’s cognitive resilience, it is imperative to learn from the success of the NCSC and establish a dedicated National Disinformation Defence Centre (NDDC). This new body should be empowered to coordinate a ‘whole-of-society’ response, bringing together expertise from government, industry, academia, and civil society. The NDDC should be equipped with cutting-edge technology and analytical capabilities to monitor, detect, and counter disinformation campaigns in real-time. Critically, it must have the authority to act decisively and coordinate effective countermeasures across all relevant sectors. Only through such a unified and empowered approach can the UK effectively defend its cognitive landscape and ensure its citizens are equipped to navigate the complex information environment of the 21st century.
