Russia’s Intensified Disinformation Assault Targets Polish-Ukrainian Relations, Exploiting WWII Trauma and AI Tools
In a concerning development for regional stability, Russia has sharply intensified its anti-Ukrainian information campaign within Poland, escalating the volume of manipulative content by a staggering 250% according to the Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD). This sophisticated new wave of Kremlin-backed psychological warfare is no longer limited to simple fake news or economic scare tactics; instead, it represents a calculated, multi-layered assault leveraging bot networks, artificial intelligence, and the most painful historical wounds of the Polish nation. The CCD, which monitors and analyzes hostile information operations, has observed that this surge is strategically centered on one of the most sensitive and emotionally charged issues in bilateral relations: the complex and tragic history of World War II. By weaponizing historical narratives, Russian propagandists are attempting to manufacture artificial conflict between two of the most crucial frontline allies in the ongoing war against Moscow, aiming to drive a wedge that could fundamentally destabilize the European security architecture. The timing is deliberate, coinciding with renewed Western military support for Kyiv and increasing Polish integration into Ukraine’s defense logistics, making this information campaign a direct threat to the cohesion of NATO’s eastern flank.
The mechanics of this disinformation onslaught are distinctly modern, combining legacy propaganda tactics with cutting-edge technological amplification. The CCD has reported that Russian state media and affiliated covert networks are actively disseminating anti-Ukrainian content on Polish social media platforms, with a significant portion being generated or augmented by artificial intelligence. This AI-created content includes fabricated audio, manipulated video, and highly realistic but entirely false images designed to evoke visceral reactions against Ukrainians. Simultaneously, the Kremlin is deploying vast legions of automated bots to amplify these narratives organically, artificially inflating hashtags, spamming comment sections, and creating the illusion of widespread grassroots Polish animosity toward Ukrainian refugees and the Ukrainian government. Among the most dangerous fake stories being pushed are the absurd claim of a “Ukrainian missile” deliberately targeting Polish territory—an attempt to exploit fears of spillover from the war—and the inflammatory assertion that “Poland will host the Ukrainian Armed Forces for 10 years,” which is spun to suggest Polish subjugation or a NATO-led occupation of the country. These falsehoods are meticulously crafted to tap into pre-existing fears about Polish sovereignty and security, intending to foster a negative attitude toward Ukraine and deepen mistrust between ordinary Poles and Ukrainians who previously enjoyed historically unprecedented solidarity since the start of the full-scale invasion.
To fully grasp the potency of this disinformation campaign, one must examine the deep historical context that the Kremlin is cynically exploiting. Poland and Ukraine share a fraught relationship characterized by periods of alliance and tragic conflict, particularly during the Second World War, including the Volhynia massacre where tens of thousands of Poles were killed by Ukrainian nationalist forces, and subsequent Polish operations against Ukrainian civilians. These events remain live, painful wounds in Polish collective memory, often surfacing in political discourse and academic debate. Russian propagandists, understanding this sensitivity, have pivoted from older narratives about NATO expansion to deliberately excavate these historical grievances, using them to frame modern Ukrainians as inherent enemies of the Polish nation. By doing so, they paint the current Ukrainian resistance against Russia as a continuation of a dangerous nationalist movement, thereby attempting to delegitimize Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty in the eyes of a crucial European ally. This revisionist history is not about scholarly debate; it is a weapon designed to provoke hostility that can translate into political pressure on the Polish government to reduce support for Kyiv. The CCD notes that the Kremlin views these historical topics as an “emotional key” that opens the door to extreme polarization, undermining rational debate and replacing it with visceral anger that is difficult to counter with mere factual rebuttals.
The Kremlin’s primary strategic objective in this coordinated assault is to dismantle the formidable strategic partnership between Ukraine and Poland, a partnership that has become the backbone of Western military aid logistics. Poland serves as the primary transshipment hub for most Western weapons and military hardware destined for Ukraine, has accepted millions of refugees, and acts as a vociferous advocate for Kyiv within NATO and the European Union. If this relationship can be fractured through sustained disinformation, Russia could effectively kneecap Ukraine’s supply lines and cripple its defensive capacity without firing a single additional (but using targeted bullets against the alliance). The Kremlin seeks to weaken this partnership by artificially increasing tensions, hoping that Polish public opinion will turn so sour that the government is forced to adopt a more conciliatory stance toward Moscow or at least but significantly reduce its logistical and financial commitment to Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia aims to use this manufactured discord to sow chaos within the EU itself. If Poland and Ukraine are seen as bickering, it provides cover for other European nations—such as Hungary or Austria—to further derail consensus on sanctions and aid packages, claiming that the “Ukraine-Poland axis” is crumbling and thus justifying a diminished European commitment to the war effort. In essence, the disinformation war is a force multiplier for Russia’s failing conventional military, representing the cheapest and most effective way to achieve strategic gains without risking troops on the battlefield.
Responding to this serious threat, Ukrainian and Polish intelligence agencies, government officials, and civil society organizations have been forced to mount an aggressive counteroffensive to protect the fabric of their bilateral relationship. The Center for Countering Disinformation, operating under Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, has been issuing urgent public warnings, detailing the exact narratives being pushed and tracing them back to identifiable Russian bot clusters and state-run media echo chambers. Polish fact-checking organizations like Demagog and independent investigative journalists have joined forces to debunk the AI-generated deepfakes and fabricated stories in near real-time, attempting to stem the tide before it can take hold in the public consciousness. At the official level, Ukrainian and Polish leaders have made concerted efforts to publicly reaffirm their unwavering mutual support, engaging in symbolic gestures of friendship, signing agreement on making joint weapons production, and conducting joint drills to demonstrate unity. The CCD also took the opportunity to explicitly refute the false predictions of two-week lockdowns in Ukraine this winter, a classic fear-mongering tactic designed to sow panic and suggest Ukrainian state collapse. To further dispel narratives of weakness, Ukraine’s energy regulators have announced plans to increase gas imports from Poland and are actively preparing the national power grid for the upcoming heating season, which is forecast to be no less challenging than the previous one, directly countering Russian narratives that Ukrainian infrastructure is on the verge of total collapse under missile strikes.
As the autumn and winter period approaches, this information war is converging with the physical war and the energy battle to create a dangerous nexus of hybrid threats. The Kremlin is betting that by combining a massive aerial missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure with a relentless psychological campaign against Poland, it can break the will of both nations. The false allegation of a “Ukrainian missile” and the “10-year hosting” narrative are precisely designed to preemptively blame Ukraine for any collateral damage, weather-related blackouts, or political friction, manipulating the vulnerable Polish psyche to blame Kyiv for its own suffering rather than Moscow. However, Ukraine is not passive in this fight; the government is hardening its own digital resilience, acknowledging that while they cannot control Russian propaganda, they can prepare their citizens and allies to recognize it. The increasing gas imports from Poland force the two countries into even greater energy interdependence, paradoxically solidifying their economic and strategic bonds even as the Kremlin tries to tear them apart. Ultimately, this surge in disinformation, while dangerous, is also a signal of Russian weakness—a desperate attempt to use fake news and AI hallucinations to achieve what its military cannot. The long-term resilience of the Ukrainian-Polish relationship will undoubtedly be tested in the coming months, but the shared existential threat from Moscow has created a powerful, though fragile, bond built on mutual security interests and democratic solidarity, a bond that robust counter-disinformation measures, transparent communication, and historical reconciliation efforts must continue to nurture if they are to prevail against the Kremlin’s agents of chaos.
