Russia is waging an information war against Europe, and according to Magnus Hjort, an official at the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, elections are one of the Kremlin’s most valuable battlegrounds. In a stark assessment, Hjort warned that Moscow treats the democratic process as an “opportunity” for Vladimir Putin’s information-war machine to stoke division, erode public trust, and polarise European societies from within. His agency, he said, is seeing a “constant flow” of foreign information manipulation and interference, coming not only from Russia but also from China and Iran. The immediate focus, however, is on Russia’s bot army, which is now targeting elections in Germany, France, and other major European nations. The warning comes at a moment of acute political vulnerability, with far-right parties that are widely seen as more sympathetic to the Kremlin expected to make record gains in a series of crucial votes. Hjort stressed that the problem is not merely one of hostile commentary or propaganda, but of organised, automated networks designed to distort online debate, sow confusion, and amplify extreme views. These networks, he argued, are not accident or organic outrage; they are deliberate instruments of foreign influence, and they are particularly dangerous because they can operate quietly for long periods before their true nature becomes visible. The message from Stockholm is clear: European democracies are under systematic attack, and the attackers are becoming more sophisticated, more patient, and more confident.
The Kremlin’s primary targets are Europe’s most powerful nations, and the evidence is already visible in recent electoral contests. In Germany, Russia’s disinformation machinery is concentrating on regional votes, with the far-right, pro-Russian Alternative for Germany, or AfD, achieving a significant result in the Saxony-Anhalt state election on September 6, securing a substantial share of the vote. In France, the focus is on the upcoming presidential campaign, where Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally and a prominent contender for the April 2027 election, is currently leading in the polls. These are not random choices. Moscow understands that if far-right parties with a history of sympathy toward the Kremlin can gain ground in Berlin and Paris, the entire European consensus on support for Ukraine could begin to crack. The objective, according to Hjort, is to make voters doubt whether their politicians should keep sending money and weapons to Kyiv. To achieve this, Russian information warfare is peddling fake stories about Ukrainian corruption and other abuses, hoping that repeated exposure to such narratives will gradually change public opinion and weaken political will. By tying the issue of aid to Ukraine to themes of waste, fraud, and ingratitude, the Kremlin seeks to build a case that resonates with ordinary voters who are already worried about the cost of living and the strain on national budgets.
One of the most insidious tactics identified by Hjort’s team is a method known as the Matryoshka, or Russian doll, technique. The idea is to distract fact-checkers, journalists, and other professional truth-seekers by sending them emails that say, in effect, “look what the Russians are doing.” These emails point to a specific video clip or piece of content that appears to be Russian disinformation. The hope is that journalists and fact-checkers will pick it up, chase the lead, and then publish a debunking article saying, “This is false.” But by doing so, they are actually wasting their time and attention on material that the Kremlin has carefully selected to keep them busy. The Matryoshka method is clever because it turns the machinery of verification against itself. The more diligently journalists work to expose a piece of Russian propaganda, the more time they spend away from investigating the real operations that matter. It also creates a sense of confusion and fatigue, as media professionals find themselves constantly chasing shadows, never quite sure whether a given story is genuine, manipulated, or completely fabricated. This is exactly the kind of ambiguity that authoritarian influence operations seek to generate; when nothing can be trusted, the very idea of objective truth begins to dissolve, and the divisions within a society grow deeper.
Hjort also made clear that the burden of defending democracy cannot rest solely on government agencies and journalists; the social media platforms themselves must do far more. He pointed to Meta, TikTok, and X as companies that need to step up their efforts to dismantle the networks of automated accounts, or bots, that spread foreign disinformation and run influence campaigns. In his view, the platforms know about these problems but treat them largely as an inconvenience rather than an existential threat to open societies. “Social media giants have their agenda which is to make money,” Hjort said. “We have a different agenda. We want to get rid of bot networks targeting our democracies. Of course, they do not want them on their platforms. That’s not the issue, but it’s a hassle to remove them.” That distinction is vital. It suggests that the platforms are not necessarily complicit in spreading disinformation, but they are also not sufficiently motivated to stop it. Removing bot networks is difficult, expensive, and time-consuming, and it offers little direct commercial benefit. As long as the platforms continue to prioritise engagement over integrity, Russian bots will find fertile ground in the comment sections, hashtag feeds, and recommendation algorithms of the world’s largest online spaces. Hjort’s frustration is shared by many election monitors and cybersecurity experts who argue that tech companies have a moral and civic responsibility that they have yet to fully embrace.
The scale of the bot problem was illustrated by a recent discovery made by the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency. Hjort said Sweden has pinpointed one state actor responsible for a bot network of 1,200 accounts on X, a network that was targeting Sweden and other countries. The accounts began their lives innocuously, discussing uncontroversial topics such as holidays and sport, likely in an effort to appear genuine and build credibility. Over time, however, the network published a total of 50,000 posts and comments in 2025 and 2026, shifting to intentionally divisive views on key political questions. The posts were fiercely in favor of, or fiercely against, a range of polarising issues, a pattern that is designed not to convince anyone but to inflame existing tensions. By taking both extremes in a debate, a bot network can make a society appear far more fractured than it really is, pushing moderates away from public discourse and driving people into angry online camps. The Swedish agency assessed that, at the moment, there was no clear evidence of a “coordinated campaign targeting Sweden,” but the network was nonetheless active and clearly capable of being activated at any time. This quiet, patient approach is typical of Russian influence operations, which often spend months or years building networks before deploying them in a targeted way.
Hjort’s final message is that the best way to deal with these campaigns is to deny them engagement. Bots and trolls thrive on attention; their goal is to provoke a reaction, to make people click, share, and argue, and to draw journalists into endless cycles of debunking and outrage. When society refuses to take the bait, the influence operation loses its power. That does not mean ignoring disinformation, but it does mean resisting the urge to amplify it. The public, the media, and the platforms all have a role to play. Journalists must report on these threats without magnifying the specific claims, and ordinary citizens must be careful about what they share online, especially when an account or post seems designed to provoke a strong emotional response. The threat from Moscow, and from other authoritarian actors, is not going to disappear. It is adapting, evolving, and finding new ways to exploit the cracks in open societies. But the warnings from Hjort and the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency are a reminder that these campaigns can be countered with patience, resilience, and a shared commitment to the truth. The coming elections in Germany and France will be a critical test, not just for the candidates and parties, but for the capacity of European democracies to defend themselves against an enemy that fights with algorithms instead of armies and seeks to win not by conquest, but by making us doubt one another.
