Foreign actors spreading disinformation across the European Union should face harsher sanctions, the European Parliament said on Tuesday (15 September), as MEPs overwhelmingly endorsed a report identifying Russia as the primary external threat to Europe’s security and democratic integrity. The resolution, passed in Strasbourg by 420 votes to 220, with 26 abstentions, seeks to put new political weight behind the European Democracy Shield (EDS), a counter-interference initiative proposed by the European Commission in 2025. The vote was framed by its supporters as a defence of open societies against covert manipulation, rather than an attempt to restrict legitimate dissent. Swedish centre-right MEP Tomas Tobé, who led the report, said Russia was “using troll factories and bot networks and investing massively to try to destabilise our societies.” His comments echoed the resolution’s central finding: that Moscow has moved from hybrid sabotage and cyber attacks to sustained information warfare aimed at eroding public trust in elections, media and democratic institutions. Nathalie Loiseau, the French centrist MEP who chairs the committee that drafted the text, added a warning about the dangers of artificial amplification: “Freedom of expression is not the freedom for robots to artificially amplify the debates crafted outside of Europe.” The vote gives political cover to the European Commission as it prepares to turn the EDS into concrete legislative proposals, including a possible framework for sanctioning individuals and entities involved in disinformation campaigns. It also sends a direct signal to the Council, which is responsible for EU sanctions and which has so far been reluctant to use its legal powers to target the organisers of influence operations. The large majority—with mainstream conservative, socialist, liberal and green MEPs voting together—underscores the extent to which foreign interference has moved from a niche concern to a central security issue in Brussels. But the report is not binding, and its real impact will depend on whether member states are willing to follow its recommendations with actual sanctions and investment in resilience.
At the core of the resolution is the European Democracy Shield, a project conceived by the European Commission in 2025 to coordinate action against foreign interference in all EU member states. The EDS is designed to bring together early-warning systems, media literacy programmes, strategic communications, cybersecurity, and legal mechanisms to impose costs on those who attack European democracy. The Parliament’s report does more than endorse the Commission’s general direction; it sets out specific demands. MEPs argue that the current sanctions regimes are too narrow and too slow. Existing EU measures can punish cyber attackers and human rights abusers, but they do not systematically cover disinformation operators, troll farms, fake media outlets and proxy networks that are used by foreign states to influence political outcomes. The report calls for harsher sanctions against foreign actors spreading disinformation, including asset freezes, travel bans and restrictions on access to financial services and digital advertising markets. It also calls for a more robust legal framework that would allow the EU to respond quickly when interference is detected, rather than waiting for consensus among all 27 member states. However, the Parliament has no legal power over Russia sanctions, which are decided by national governments in the Council, nor can it force the Commission to implement the EDS in the exact form MEPs want. Its role is political: to create pressure, shape the debate, and make it harder for governments to ignore the problem. The resolution’s timing is significant. It comes as several member states are reporting increased activity by Russian state media and online influence networks ahead of national elections. Loiseau told reporters that the shield must protect Europe without undermining the freedom that makes democracy worth defending. “We are not talking about limiting freedom of expression,” she insisted. “We are talking about preventing robots from artificially amplifying debates crafted outside Europe.” The report distinguishes between robust public debate, which must be protected, and coordinated manipulation, which must be exposed and punished. That distinction is likely to be central as the Commission drafts new rules.
The scale of opposition to the report, with 220 MEPs voting against, shows how divisive the issue has become. Most of the no votes came from the hard-right and far-right groups in the European Parliament, including the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy. For many of these lawmakers, the Democracy Shield looks less like a defence against foreign interference and more like an instrument of internal censorship that can be used against patriotic and nationalist voices. Polish ECR MEP Beata Szydło delivered the most pointed criticism, saying: “We have to fight foreign interference, but the answer to attacks from the outside is not interference from within.” Her words were widely interpreted as an attack on the EU’s previous use of legal mechanisms against her own party, the then-ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, which was subjected to EU rule-of-law procedures and sanctions-related debates while in power in Warsaw until 2023. For Szydło and others, the fight against disinformation can become a pretext for Brussels to discipline member states whose governments are not aligned with the mainstream EU consensus. They also argue that accusations of Russian interference are often used to delegitimise parties that campaign against immigration, EU federalism and green transition policies. The far-right’s opposition is not monolithic. Some far-right MEPs have adopted pro-Kremlin positions and have been accused of amplifying Russian propaganda in the European Parliament itself. Others, especially those from central and eastern Europe, are strongly anti-Russian but fear that an EU-wide censorship regime would give Brussels too much power. The report’s critics on the left, meanwhile, have warned that sanctions against foreign actors should not be used to silence whistle-blowers, journalists and civil society groups. The Parliament will need to navigate these sensitivities as it continues to develop the EDS. The vote nevertheless demonstrates that there is no majority in the European Parliament for abandoning the fight against disinformation; the debate is about how, not whether, to fight it.
The resolution’s central identification of Russia as the “primary external threat to Europe’s security and democratic integrity” is a significant escalation in the EU’s official language. It places Moscow above other sources of foreign interference, including China and radical Islamist propaganda, which are also monitored by EU institutions but not named in the same way. The report details the methods used by Russian actors: troll factories and bot networks that artificially inflate certain narratives; the use of state-controlled media and fake local news sites; the recruitment of European politicians and influencers as proxies; cyber attacks that steal and leak emails; and the deployment of AI-generated content and deepfakes to confuse voters. Tobé said that Russia is “investing massively” in these efforts, and that the EU must respond with comparable resources and determination. The report calls for the EU to extend its sanctions framework to cover information manipulation, a step that would require unanimous agreement from member states. That is a high bar, since some governments have historically been wary of creating new legal categories that could be used against their own media or political opponents. The resolution also calls for better coordination between EU institutions, NATO and national intelligence services, and for more support for independent media and fact-checkers in countries most exposed to Russian influence. It acknowledges that Moscow is adapting quickly, moving from crude bots to more sophisticated operations that exploit real social and political grievances. The response, MEPs argue, must therefore be equally adaptive. The report’s language on Russia is likely to provoke a sharp response from the Kremlin, which has repeatedly denied running disinformation campaigns and has portrayed EU efforts to fight interference as an attack on freedom of expression. But the European Parliament’s message is clear: inaction is more dangerous than overreaction. The next step will be for the Commission to incorporate the report’s recommendations into the EDS proposal, and for member states to decide whether they are willing to adopt a new sanctions regime designed specifically for information warfare.
Politically, the report is a victory for the European Parliament’s mainstream parties, which have made foreign interference a top priority. It also represents a test of the Commission’s willingness to move beyond declarations and deliver a legally workable European Democracy Shield. The Commission first floated the EDS in 2025, but since then it has struggled to turn the idea into concrete measures. The Parliament’s resolution gives the Commission a mandate to be bolder. It calls for the creation of a “sanctions list” for disinformation actors, similar to the EU’s Magnitsky-style human rights sanctions, but specifically tailored to individuals and entities involved in foreign interference. It also calls for stronger powers to remove or demonetise content that is part of a foreign influence operation, while making clear that this should not lead to the censorship of unpopular or dissenting opinions. The report asks member states to pool intelligence and share evidence more quickly, so that sanctions can be applied while the interference is still under way, rather than months or years later. It also calls for public awareness campaigns to make citizens more resilient to manipulation. In this sense, the report is not only about punishment; it is about prevention. The broad mainstream support for the report, including from parties that have been deeply divided on other issues, suggests that foreign interference has become one of the few areas where the EU can agree on a strong common response. The 220 no votes, however, mean that any attempt to legislate will face a well-organised opposition. The far-right parties that voted against the report are expected to challenge the EDS in every committee and plenary session. They will argue that the shield is a mechanism for Brussels to control the internet and silence dissidents. Their message resonates with voters who are already suspicious of EU institutions. The Parliament’s response will be to emphasise the difference between a foreign actor with a state budget and a citizen with a legitimate opinion. The challenge for the EU is to make that distinction work in practice, with clear rules, independent oversight and judicial review.
The European Democracy Shield will ultimately be judged by its ability to protect democracy without damaging the open society it is meant to preserve. Tuesday’s report offers a strong statement of intent, but it is only one step in a longer political and legislative process. The Parliament has no direct power to impose sanctions on Russia or to instruct the Commission on how to design the EDS. Its influence comes from the moral and political weight of a large majority, and from the message it sends to both foreign adversaries and EU governments. The 420 MEPs who voted for the report are telling the Commission that they expect the EDS to have real teeth. They are also telling the Council that sanctions against disinformation actors should no longer be considered an extraordinary measure, but a normal part of the EU’s toolbox. At the same time, the report is a warning to the Kremlin that the EU is aware of its tactics and is preparing to respond. Russian troll factories, bot networks and fake media outlets have flourished in the past because they operated in a grey zone, protected by legal loopholes and by the difficulty of proving who is behind them. The report attempts to close that grey zone by defining foreign interference as a distinct form of attack, separate from legitimate debate, and by calling for sanctions that can be applied to individuals and entities. The large vote in Strasbourg does not end the debate. The 220 MEPs who voted against the report include not only far-right populists but also principled defenders of online freedom, who fear that the fight against disinformation may become a pretext for surveillance and censorship. Their concerns cannot be dismissed. The difference between protecting democracy and restricting it can be very thin. The EU will have to prove that it can navigate that line. The next few years will show whether the European Democracy Shield becomes a genuine shield for democratic integrity or a bureaucratic weapon that erodes the freedoms it claims to defend. For now, the Parliament has made its choice: foreign actors spreading disinformation should face harsher sanctions, and Russia should be in no doubt that Europe is watching.
