Political parties and candidates that spread disinformation ahead of South Africa’s local government elections will face heavy penalties, including fines, campaign restrictions and, in serious cases, cancellation of their registration. This is the consequence of the Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections, a new binding framework promulgated by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC). The code came into effect after being gazetted this month and has been formally issued under Section 88 of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act. The IEC said the code forms part of the Electoral Code of Conduct, meaning that any violation will be treated as a breach of the electoral code and will be subject to sanctions under the existing law. The commission has framed the code as a vital safeguard for the integrity of the electoral process, as well as a guarantee that voters will have access to accurate information before casting their ballots. With the local government elections scheduled for 4 November, the code applies immediately to all parties, candidates, and their campaign structures. The IEC has adopted a tougher stance on disinformation in response to the rising influence of social media and digital platforms in political communication, where falsehoods can spread rapidly and reach millions of voters before they are corrected. By making the code part of the broader electoral conduct framework, the IEC has ensured that it carries real legal authority. The sanctions are not merely symbolic; they range from fines to withdrawal of campaign privileges to, in the most serious cases, the complete deregistration of a party. The message is unequivocal: election-related disinformation is a serious offence that will not be treated as an acceptable campaign tactic. The commission also noted that the code is intended to complement existing safeguards that already prohibit hate speech, incitement, and false statements about candidates. However, the new provisions focus specifically on the phenomenon of disinformation, which is often spread through fake accounts, manipulated media, and viral messaging. The IEC said it is determined to protect voters from being manipulated and to ensure that the elections reflect the true will of the people.
The legal architecture of the code is crucial for understanding how it will work in practice. Because the code has been incorporated into the Electoral Code of Conduct, a contravention will be dealt with through the enforcement mechanisms that already exist for electoral misconduct in local government elections. This means that complaints can be lodged, investigated, and adjudicated without the need for a new, separate legal framework. The IEC said the sanctions range from fines and campaign restrictions to cancellation of a party’s registration in serious cases. Fines are likely to be imposed for lesser or first-time offences, while campaign restrictions could include limits on advertising, access to broadcasting time, or the holding of public events. The cancellation of registration is the most severe sanction available, and it would effectively remove a party from the electoral contest. The IEC will presumably reserve this penalty for cases where disinformation has been deliberate, sustained, and damaging to the integrity of the election. Because Section 88 of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act provides the legal basis for the code, the IEC can defend its actions in court if a party challenges the validity of the rules or the severity of a sanction. At the same time, the commission will have to exercise its powers carefully. It must distinguish between disinformation and honest mistakes, and between a party’s official position and the actions of individual social media users who are not authorised to speak for the party. The existence of clear sanctions does not mean they will be applied to every minor infraction, but it does give the IEC the ability to act when the integrity of the election is threatened. The code may also have a strong deterrent effect. Political parties know that a single viral falsehood could expose them to penalties or jeopardise their registration. This is likely to encourage party leaders to take a more careful approach to their online communications and to ensure that their supporters understand the rules. The commission said the sanctions are part of a graduated response, allowing it to match the punishment to the severity of the offence.
The decision to introduce the code comes at a time when political parties are more dependent than ever on digital platforms to reach voters. The internet, social media, and instant messaging applications have revolutionised political campaigning in South Africa, allowing parties to communicate directly with millions of voters without the mediation of traditional news organisations. But these same tools have created new opportunities for the spread of fabricated information. The IEC has expressed concern that disinformation could be used to influence voters, discredit opponents, or undermine confidence in the electoral process itself. In a local government election, the issues at stake are tangible: municipal services, housing, water, electricity, infrastructure, and local development. False claims on these subjects can distort the choices made by communities and damage the relationship between residents and their elected representatives. Disinformation can also deepen social divisions, especially where false narratives are tailored around race, ethnicity, political affiliation, or geographic identity. The speed at which false content travels on social media makes the problem particularly difficult to solve. A single post can be shared thousands of times in minutes, and by the time it is fact-checked or debunked, the false impression may have already taken hold. The new code is an attempt to address this reality by placing the primary responsibility for accurate communication on the parties and candidates themselves. It is also a recognition that traditional media regulation, which applies to broadcasters and newspapers, no longer covers the largest share of political communication. The code therefore extends the principle of accountability to the digital sphere, where it is most needed. It is not intended to discourage parties from using technology or innovation in their campaigns. Rather, it is designed to ensure that the speed of online communication does not come at the expense of accuracy and honesty. By making parties accountable for the content they publish, the IEC hopes to create an environment in which voters can make informed decisions without constantly having to question whether the information they receive is true.
The specific obligations imposed by the code are practical and far-reaching. Parties and candidates will be required to verify information before publishing it, and to assume responsibility for any material published by them or on their behalf. This means that a party cannot avoid disciplinary action by claiming that the false information was posted by a volunteer, a supporter, or a campaign staff member without the leader’s direct knowledge. The duty of verification requires parties to take reasonable steps to establish the truth of factual claims before releasing them to the public. In addition, parties and candidates will have 36 hours to publicly retract and correct false or misleading information after becoming aware of it. The timeframe is intentionally strict. In the heat of an election campaign, false information can cause irreversible harm within a day, so a correction must come quickly to have any chance of limiting the damage. The code also requires parties to censure those responsible where appropriate. This could mean issuing a public statement distancing the party from the content, removing a campaign official, or taking formal disciplinary action against a member who created or shared the false material. These internal obligations are important because they encourage campaigns to self-regulate rather than waiting for outside enforcement. Taken together, the requirements of verification, correction, and internal accountability form a comprehensive framework for responsible political communication. They also align with broader societal expectations that political actors should be truthful, especially when their statements are capable of influencing how people vote. The IEC has emphasised that the code does not require perfection; it requires parties and candidates to act responsibly when mistakes are identified and to avoid deliberately misleading voters. Parties may now need to put in place procedures for checking social media posts, press releases, and advertising content; for monitoring comments and shares; and for responding quickly to reports of false information. The code is likely to change the way campaigns are managed, particularly where digital strategists and social media teams are involved. It is not enough for a party to remain silent when false content circulates in its name.
The IEC has also taken steps to protect the credibility of the electoral administration itself. The code specifically prohibits disinformation targeting the commission, its commissioners, and its staff. This provision is intended to prevent malicious claims that election officials are biased, incompetent, or corrupt, which could undermine public confidence in the outcome of the vote. Where such disinformation occurs, parties and candidates will be required to correct the information publicly. The commission has also designated Real411 as the official platform for reporting suspected election-related disinformation. Real411 provides a mechanism for the public to report content that they believe violates the code, such as false statements about candidates, parties, or the electoral process. The IEC has urged the public to report cases within 36 hours of becoming aware of them. This reporting period matches the 36-hour correction deadline imposed on parties, ensuring that a complaint made through Real411 can be processed while the false content is still in circulation. The use of Real411 is a significant step because it involves ordinary citizens in the enforcement of the code. The IEC cannot possibly monitor every tweet, Facebook post, WhatsApp message, or video generated during an election campaign. By encouraging voters to report suspicious content, the commission can receive real-time information about disinformation as it emerges. This is particularly useful in local government elections, where attention is spread across many municipalities and where issues vary from one community to another. The public should therefore see Real411 as an important tool, not only for removing harmful content but also for promoting a culture of truth and accountability in political communication. The commission said the platform can be accessed by voters who want to play a role in protecting the integrity of the elections. Once a report is received, it will be assessed in accordance with the code and the relevant regulations. The public reporting window is designed to be short enough to allow effective intervention, but not so short that citizens are discouraged from coming forward.
With the local government elections now approaching, the new code sends a strong signal about the importance of truth in democratic processes. It represents one of the most direct attempts by the IEC to regulate online political communication and to hold parties and candidates accountable for the content they generate or amplify. The success of the code will depend on several factors. First, political parties must comply with the rules and demonstrate that they take the threat of disinformation seriously. Second, the IEC must be willing to enforce the code consistently and without fear or favour, ensuring that all parties are treated equally. Third, the public must use Real411 to report suspicious content and assist the commission in identifying harmful information. There are also challenges. The line between disinformation and legitimate political campaigning is not always clear, and there is a risk that the code could be misused to silence critics. The IEC will need to be transparent about how it interprets the rules and how it handles complaints. Courts may be asked to review decisions, and the commission must be ready to defend its actions in terms of the law. Despite these challenges, the introduction of the code is a welcome development. It acknowledges that elections cannot be truly free and fair if voters are subjected to a barrage of lies designed to manipulate their choices. It places the responsibility for accurate information squarely on those who seek public office. And it gives citizens a concrete way to participate in defending the integrity of the vote. As South Africans prepare to cast their ballots on 4 November, the fight against disinformation will be a test of the entire political system. The IEC has provided the framework. The parties, candidates, and voters must now prove that they are ready to uphold it. The code also sends a message beyond South Africa’s borders. As democracies around the world struggle with online disinformation, the IEC’s approach may offer useful lessons by combining legal sanctions with public reporting and rapid correction. It shows that the defence of electoral integrity requires not only technology and laws, but also the active participation of citizens. Ultimately, the credibility of the election will depend on the conduct of everyone involved. The new rules are not a magic bullet, but they are a clear and enforceable statement of what is expected from those who seek to lead South Africa’s municipalities.
