Jos — Artificial intelligence-powered disinformation, deepfakes and coordinated online propaganda are no longer distant concerns for Nigeria’s security establishment; they are active and growing threats to the country’s security architecture and public trust, according to technology and media expert Job Mwadkon Dachungyang. Delivering the keynote address at a media workshop organised by the Directorate of Army Public Relations (DAPR) for Army public relations officers, media practitioners and communication personnel drawn from other security agencies, Dachungyang told his audience that modern security operations now unfold on two battlefields simultaneously: the physical environment and the fast-moving digital information space. The first battlefield is familiar, involving soldiers, weapons, terrain and logistics. The second is less visible but increasingly decisive, involving smartphones, social media platforms, public perception, and the relentless flow of information, disinformation and propaganda. He argued that the widespread adoption of smartphones and social media has fundamentally changed the information environment around security incidents. In the past, official statements and verified news reports could shape the narrative after an event. Today, information about security incidents often reaches millions of people before authorities have had a chance to verify the facts, meaning that the first narrative to reach the public is often incomplete, misleading or entirely false. This velocity of information creates a serious challenge for joint operations involving the military, police, intelligence agencies and other security bodies, each of which may have different communication structures, clearance protocols and levels of media readiness. When an incident occurs, these agencies may release separate statements at different times, or remain silent while unverified content dominates social media. The result is a chaotic information ecosystem that can confuse the public, undermine operational security and give adversaries an opportunity to shape the story in their favour.
Dachungyang made clear that artificial intelligence is a double-edged sword for Nigeria’s security community. On the one hand, AI offers genuine opportunities for real-time sentiment analysis, threat monitoring and early crisis detection. Security agencies can use powerful data analytics to monitor social media conversations, detect unusual spikes in activity, identify emerging flashpoints and gauge public reaction to military operations or policy decisions. AI-powered tools can help analysts process enormous volumes of open-source information much faster than human teams, making it possible to spot coordinated disinformation campaigns before they go viral. On the other hand, these same technologies are now available to malicious actors, including insurgent groups, criminal networks, political opportunists and foreign influence operations. Dachungyang warned that AI-generated fake videos, fabricated audio recordings and official-looking messages can be used to mislead the public, disrupt ongoing operations, or even imitate senior commanders to circulate false instructions. This is not a theoretical risk. The technology to create highly convincing synthetic media is now cheap, accessible and improving rapidly, and it places an unprecedented amount of deceptive power in the hands of individuals and groups with no accountability. He described deepfakes as particularly dangerous because they weaponise trust itself. Seeing a video or hearing an audio recording of a senior military officer saying something false can trigger panic among civilians, confusion among security personnel, and a breakdown of discipline within the ranks. A single convincing deepfake, shared widely on social media, can undo months of careful communication and public engagement. It can also strain relationships between military and police forces, or between security agencies and the communities they serve, because trust is difficult to build and very easy to destroy.
One of the most urgent weaknesses identified by Dachungyang is the delay in official communication during crises. He stressed that when verified information is not released quickly, rumours and speculation fill the gap immediately. The digital information space abhors a vacuum; if official sources are silent, unofficial sources will take over, and those unofficial sources are often far less concerned with accuracy, context or public safety. Social media amplifies this problem by rewarding speed and emotional engagement. False information often spreads faster than the truth because it is deliberately designed to provoke outrage, fear or confusion. Dachungyang urged security institutions to adopt faster verification and communication systems capable of matching the speed of online misinformation, even under the pressure of active operations. He acknowledged that the military must maintain confidentiality and operational security, but he insisted that a premature wave of speculation can be just as damaging to a mission as an unauthorised disclosure. The answer, he suggested, is not simply to speak more quickly, but to build an end-to-end communication process that runs parallel to operational planning, with clear thresholds for what can be said, when it can be said and who is authorised to say it. He also highlighted the persistent problem of communication silos among the military, police, intelligence agencies and other security institutions. Too often, he said, these different bodies operate with separate media teams, separate public-relations strategies and separate clearance chains, and they do not share information with one another in real time. As a result, conflicting statements are issued to the public, sometimes about the same incident. These contradictions can undermine otherwise successful operations and erode public confidence in the entire security system. Dachungyang argued that media and public relations must be integrated into operational planning from the very beginning, not treated as an administrative afterthought to be dealt with after the fighting is over.
Underlying all of these concerns, according to Dachungyang, is a deeper argument about the central role of public trust in national security. He said that communities are far more likely to cooperate with security agencies when those institutions demonstrate credibility, consistency, clarity, speed and transparency. Citizens are the eyes and ears of any security operation, and the flow of actionable information from ordinary people to military and police forces is often the difference between success and failure, particularly in areas affected by insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence or other insecurity. But citizens will only share what they know when they believe the security forces are worthy of their confidence. If the public sees contradictory statements, delayed responses, or official messages that are easily outgunned by deepfakes and disinformation, they will withdraw into silence or, worse, assume that the armed forces are either dishonest or ineffective. Dachungyang insisted that public trust is not a soft issue or a public-relations luxury; it is a core element of national security strategy. When trust is strong, communities become active participants in their own defence, reporting suspicious movements, identifying unknown vehicles, rejecting recruitment efforts by extremist groups and refusing to shelter criminals. When trust is weak, security forces operate in an information vacuum, cut off from the very intelligence they need to protect lives and property. He also noted that transparency, when appropriately balanced with the requirements of operational secrecy, builds long-term resilience against disinformation. A public that has learned to trust official channels is less likely to be swayed by a cleverly fabricated video or a false rumour, because they have seen, repeatedly, that official communication is reliable. This reservoir of trust is among the most valuable assets a security institution can possess, especially in an era where adversaries can manufacture convincing fake realities at the touch of a button.
To counter these emerging digital threats, Dachungyang recommended the establishment of specialised AI verification and fact-checking units within the security sector. These units would be tasked with detecting deepfakes, investigating coordinated online manipulation campaigns and verifying digital content before it is allowed to shape public perception. They would need a combination of technical expertise, open-source intelligence skills, media literacy and rapid-reporting authority so that their findings can reach decision-makers and the public without unnecessary delay. He also proposed the creation of multi-agency media intelligence frameworks to ensure real-time coordination during joint operations. Under such a framework, representatives from the military, police, intelligence and other relevant bodies would share threat assessments, communication plans and verified information in a shared operational picture, rather than working in isolation. This would help prevent conflicting statements, reduce the time needed to issue corrections and allow security forces to push back quickly against disinformation narratives. Dachungyang further called for deeper collaboration between security institutions, media organisations and judicial authorities to tackle malicious disinformation and digital manipulation as serious crimes. The media have a crucial role to play as gatekeepers of information, but they too are being targeted by sophisticated influence operations and can easily be used to legitimise false content. By working together, security agencies and the press can establish protocols for rapid verification, responsible reporting and the preservation of evidence, while the judiciary can ensure that those who manufacture or spread malicious deepfakes face credible consequences. This type of inter-institutional cooperation is essential, Dachungyang argued, because no single agency, no matter how advanced its technology, can defend the information space alone.
Dachungyang concluded by saying that the evolving information landscape requires security leaders and public relations officers to adopt a new three-part leadership model: battle-ready, media-ready, and AI-aware. This model, he explained, demands a broad understanding of tactical operations, crisis communication, digital verification and the influence of AI-driven platforms on public narratives. It is no longer enough for a commander to excel only in conventional military planning; they must also understand how social media algorithms work, how deepfakes are made, how disinformation spreads across ethnic and religious fault lines, and how a single viral post can change the course of an operation. Likewise, public relations officers must understand the operational realities and security constraints of their armed forces, rather than simply issuing polished statements. The fusion of these competencies, Dachungyang said, will determine whether Nigerian security institutions can maintain the initiative in the digital battlefield or continually find themselves reacting to crises that originated online. His remarks were delivered at a workshop that aligns with the Nigerian Army’s ongoing efforts to strengthen media engagement, sustain public support for operations and communicate successes across various theatres of operations. By bringing together army public relations officers, media practitioners and communication personnel from other security agencies, the workshop is intended to build a more coordinated, professional and forward-looking information capability. Dachungyang’s powerful warning underscored the urgency of these efforts, as the same technologies that connect Nigerian society are increasingly being turned into weapons against it. The challenge is no longer simply to win battles on the ground, but to ensure the stories told about those battles, by friends and foes alike, do not turn victory into defeat in the imagination of the public. In this new age, he said, the truth must be defended with the same discipline and speed as the nation itself.
