Tunisia’s Digital Battlefield: Disinformation and Manipulation in the Post-Coup Era
Tunisia’s political landscape, already fragile after the 2021 coup, has become increasingly entangled with the pervasive influence of online disinformation and manipulation. The 2024 presidential elections, the first since the coup, witnessed a surge in suspiciously sponsored content, both pro- and anti-regime, flooding social media platforms, particularly Facebook. This activity ranged from advertisements criticizing electoral officials to coordinated engagement from dubious profiles, highlighting the weaponization of online spaces for political gain. This surge underscores a concerning trend: the evolution of online disinformation from a cottage industry to a sophisticated, internationally orchestrated operation.
The centrality of Facebook in Tunisian political life makes it a prime target for manipulation. While disinformation campaigns are not new to the country, the scale and sophistication have dramatically increased. This "industrialization" of disinformation involves orchestrated campaigns utilizing troll profiles to manipulate public opinion, creating artificial trends and influencing political discourse. This coordinated activity raises critical questions about the future of Tunisian democracy, particularly as many citizens perceive social media as a reflection of reality. This manufactured reality, however, risks undermining public trust and distorting democratic processes.
This phenomenon is not limited to Tunisia but extends across the region. The paper by the anonymous Tunisian researchers argues that disinformation narratives, methods, and even memes are often shared and adapted across borders, suggesting a coordinated effort. This necessitates a regional approach to research and action, aiming to mitigate the impact of these "electronic flies," as they’re known in the Arab world. Understanding the interconnectedness of these campaigns is crucial to effectively combating their influence and protecting democratic values.
To understand the complexity of the issue, it’s crucial to distinguish between disinformation and manipulation. Disinformation refers to deliberately false or misleading information spread with the intent to harm, while manipulation involves the use of information, whether true or false, to manipulate public opinion or behavior. Both are employed in coordinated campaigns often orchestrated by "architects of misinformation," individuals with backgrounds in advertising and public relations who design and oversee these operations. They work in conjunction with influencers and fake account operators to create and disseminate content, blurring the lines between authentic engagement and manufactured consensus.
The 2019 Tunisian presidential elections provided an early glimpse into the growing threat of online manipulation. Investigations revealed the extensive use of fake Facebook pages to disseminate misleading content and influence voters. One investigation exposed the involvement of an Israeli company, Archimedes Group, in creating disinformation campaigns targeting multiple African countries, including Tunisia. Another investigation uncovered the activities of a Tunisian company, Ureputation, engaged in similar practices. These revelations demonstrate the international nature of these operations and the willingness of political actors to employ these tactics for their benefit.
The political upheaval of July 25, 2021, marked a turning point in the use of social media in Tunisian politics. The suspension of Parliament by President Kais Saied was preceded and accompanied by significant online mobilization, with some pages rapidly accumulating hundreds of thousands of subscribers. While the role of these pages in shaping public opinion is undeniable, it remains difficult to definitively determine the extent of manipulation without further evidence. However, the subsequent spread of anti-Ennahdha narratives, often amplified by accounts linked to the UAE-Egypt-Saudi Arabia axis, further blurred the lines between genuine public sentiment and coordinated disinformation campaigns.
The manipulative tactics used in Tunisian politics have since expanded to target vulnerable populations, notably sub-Saharan African migrants. Beginning in 2021, a hate campaign fueled by false rumors and xenophobic rhetoric spread across Tunisian social media, culminating in President Saied’s inflammatory speech in 2023. This campaign, utilizing Facebook groups, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter), employed similar tropes and narratives observed in other countries, including Morocco and Egypt, suggesting a transnational network of far-right influences. These movements exploit historical narratives, nostalgia for a perceived glorious past, and anti-immigrant sentiment to sow discord and advance their agendas.
The increasing sophistication of these campaigns involves the use of veiled accounts posing as history enthusiasts, interspersed with racist content, to bypass platform moderation. This highlights the challenges in effectively moderating content in Arabic dialects and the limitations of automated systems. The prevalence of hate speech and disinformation online underscores the urgent need for improved content moderation practices and greater accountability from social media platforms.
A particularly insidious aspect of online manipulation is the rise of troll farms disguised as digital communications companies. Employing a model similar to that used in the 2015 US elections, these farms operate networks of fake accounts to manipulate public discourse, creating a false sense of consensus around specific narratives. These operations thrive in regions with high youth unemployment, exploiting precarious economic conditions. The anonymity and lack of regulation surrounding these practices make them difficult to track and combat, posing a significant threat to democratic processes.
The proliferation of online disinformation and manipulation presents a grave challenge to democracy globally, particularly in countries like Tunisia, where trust in institutions is low and democratic norms are still developing. While social media initially held promise as a tool for social movements and democratic participation, it has increasingly become a platform for manipulation and the spread of disinformation. The current regulatory landscape, exemplified by Tunisia’s Decree-Law 54, often proves ineffective in addressing the underlying issue of industrialized disinformation while simultaneously being used to stifle legitimate criticism.
Addressing this challenge requires a multi-pronged approach. Social media companies must be held accountable for content moderation, particularly in languages and dialects often neglected by automated systems. Investment in research is crucial to understand the impact of these campaigns, identify their sponsors, and develop effective countermeasures. Fact-checking initiatives, while valuable, are insufficient on their own. Media literacy programs are essential to empower individuals to critically evaluate online information and resist manipulation. Finally, activists and civil society organizations must grapple with the implications of operating within a digital landscape increasingly dominated by disinformation and manipulation, exploring strategies to navigate these challenging spaces effectively.
