Chinese Social Media Platforms Become Hotbeds of Political Disinformation Targeting Voters
The 2023 federal election campaign has witnessed a surge in political disinformation targeting voters on Chinese social media platforms, exacerbating a trend observed over the past five years. A research project by the University of Melbourne has revealed thousands of instances of misleading or factually incorrect political information circulating on popular Mandarin-language apps like WeChat and RedNote. The disinformation campaigns often distort or misinterpret information about major political parties, preying on the anxieties of Chinese-Australian voters, particularly concerning issues like immigration and economic policy. This manipulation is often driven by commercial interests, with migration, real estate, and education agencies exploiting the political climate for business gain.
WeChat, the dominant social media platform for Mandarin speakers globally, and RedNote, a rapidly growing platform similar to Instagram, are the primary vectors for this disinformation. While third-party news outlets on WeChat often repurpose news from reputable sources, intentional mistranslations and misinterpretations skew the narrative. RedNote, while newer to the scene, has seen an even greater volume of misleading content, potentially due to an influx of users seeking alternatives to TikTok. Both platforms provide fertile ground for disinformation to spread, as a significant portion of Chinese Australians rely on them for news and information. Research indicates that a concerning number of Chinese Australians have encountered fabricated news during the election cycle and express difficulty in discerning misinformation.
One example of disinformation highlighted by the research is a WeChat post falsely claiming that both major parties support a policy leading to the deportation of thousands of Chinese residents. Such posts often use emotionally charged imagery and language to amplify fear and anxiety within the community. This tactic is particularly effective during election periods, when political discourse is heightened and anxieties regarding potential policy changes are prevalent. The researchers emphasize that while disinformation campaigns are not new, the intensity of the election campaign provides more opportunities for exploitation. The constant stream of information and political rhetoric emanating from various sources creates an environment where misleading narratives can easily gain traction.
The shift of users from platforms like TikTok to RedNote has inadvertently facilitated the spread of disinformation. The uncertainty surrounding TikTok’s future in Western markets has driven users to alternative platforms, including RedNote, which has experienced a surge in downloads. This migration of users has unfortunately been accompanied by a parallel increase in the volume of disinformation on RedNote. The platform’s structure, with its emphasis on short-form video content, may contribute to the rapid dissemination of misleading information, making it more challenging for users to verify the credibility of the content they encounter.
The research points to a disturbing trend of commercially driven disinformation campaigns. Migration, real estate, and education agencies are capitalizing on anxieties surrounding potential policy changes to promote their services. They distort or exaggerate policy pronouncements to create a sense of urgency and fear, prompting individuals to seek their assistance. For instance, a video circulating on RedNote falsely suggested that the Immigration Minister was planning to tighten visa requirements, urging Chinese migrants to apply for permanent residency immediately and conveniently including a pitch from a migration agent. This tactic preys on the vulnerabilities of migrant communities, who may be particularly susceptible to such manipulation due to their concerns about their immigration status and future prospects.
While the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) is aware of the issue and investigates reported instances of electoral disinformation, their reach on platforms like WeChat and RedNote remains limited. The AEC currently does not have an established presence on these platforms and relies on user referrals to identify and address problematic content. Further complicating matters, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has stated that it lacks a formal regulatory role in combating misinformation and does not actively monitor it during elections. This regulatory gap presents a significant challenge in addressing the proliferation of disinformation targeting specific communities, particularly those relying on non-English language social media platforms. The absence of proactive monitoring and enforcement leaves these platforms vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation, potentially undermining the integrity of the electoral process and eroding public trust in democratic institutions.
