The UK’s Cognitive Vulnerability: A Call for a National Disinformation Defence Centre
The digital age has transformed information into a potent weapon, and the UK finds itself on the front lines of an insidious new conflict. The battlefield is not physical, but cognitive, and the ammunition is disinformation. Hostile state actors, particularly Russia and China, are actively exploiting the vulnerabilities of democratic societies, using sophisticated information warfare tactics to sow discord, manipulate public opinion, and undermine trust in institutions. While the UK has made significant strides in cybersecurity with the establishment of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a similar coordinated and empowered approach is urgently needed to counter the growing threat of state-sponsored disinformation. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review rightly identifies disinformation as a top-tier threat, but the current fragmented response leaves the UK dangerously exposed.
The nature of this threat is multifaceted and rapidly evolving. Russia and China have integrated information warfare into their national security strategies, viewing the manipulation of public perception as a core component of their geopolitical ambitions. OpenAI’s June 2025 threat intelligence report reveals the alarming scale and sophistication of these operations. State-backed actors are leveraging artificial intelligence to generate synthetic media, create fake social media personas, and manipulate online discourse with unprecedented speed and reach. These campaigns often exploit authentic information, amplifying carefully selected narratives to distort public perception and sow confusion. Algorithmic manipulation further exacerbates the problem, creating artificial echoes of public sentiment that can sway public opinion and influence policy decisions.
The financial investment by hostile nations in these disinformation campaigns is substantial. Russia alone is estimated to have spent over $1 billion on efforts aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine, a stark illustration of the resources being dedicated to this new form of conflict. These well-funded campaigns are designed to exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of open societies, where freedom of information can be manipulated and turned into a weapon. The sheer volume and velocity of disinformation, coupled with its sophisticated targeting and amplification through social media platforms, overwhelm traditional media regulation and intelligence agencies. The current fragmented approach, with responsibility dispersed across government departments, civil society organizations, and the private sector, proves inadequate in the face of this coordinated and well-resourced assault.
The UK Cabinet Office’s Chronic Risks Analysis recognizes information warfare as a systemic threat to national stability, a crucial first step in acknowledging the gravity of the situation. However, the lack of a centralized, empowered body to coordinate the response leaves the UK vulnerable. The 2024 Southport attacks and the subsequent Summer Race Riots, fueled by foreign-sponsored disinformation, serve as a stark warning of the devastating consequences of inaction. False information spread rapidly through social media, inciting violence and unrest within hours of the tragic deaths of three young girls. The fragmented response, with different government departments and agencies operating in silos, hampered efforts to contain the crisis and counter the spread of disinformation. This incident exposed the critical need for a unified and agile response mechanism capable of addressing the rapidly evolving nature of information warfare.
Drawing a parallel to the successful model of the NCSC, experts argue for the creation of a dedicated National Disinformation Defence Centre (NDDC). This centralized body would bring together expertise from across government, the intelligence community, the private sector, and academia. The NDDC would have the mandate and resources to monitor online information environments, detect and analyze disinformation campaigns, coordinate rapid response efforts, and develop proactive strategies to enhance the UK’s cognitive resilience. Such a centre would provide a focal point for public-private partnerships, enabling the sharing of information and the development of innovative solutions to counter disinformation. Crucially, the NDDC would empower the UK to take a more proactive stance, anticipating and mitigating information threats before they escalate into real-world harm.
The creation of the NCSC demonstrated the UK’s ability to respond effectively to emerging security threats. Replicating this institutional foresight is essential to address the growing challenge of disinformation. A dedicated NDDC, equipped with the necessary resources and authority, would provide a crucial line of defence against hostile state actors seeking to undermine the UK’s democracy and social cohesion. Just as the NCSC has strengthened the nation’s cybersecurity, an NDDC would bolster the UK’s cognitive resilience, ensuring that information remains a source of empowerment rather than a weapon of manipulation. The time for decisive action is now. The future of the UK’s democratic integrity may well depend on it.
