Kremlin’s Disinformation Network Primarily Targets Former Soviet States, Central Europe, and the Balkans: An In-Depth Analysis
A recent study conducted by the Bulgarian Centre for Information, Democracy and Citizenship and Sensika Technologies has unveiled the extent of Russia’s disinformation campaign, revealing that its primary targets are countries in Central Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. This network of disinformation, dubbed the "Pravda Ecosystem," has been aggressively disseminating pro-Russian narratives as part of Moscow’s broader strategy against Europe, particularly since the onset of the war in Ukraine. The analysis, titled “The Pravda Ecosystem: An Analysis of the Kremlin’s Regional Disinformation Strategy,” examined over 640,000 publications across 45 countries from December 2024 to March 2025, focusing on a network of over 190 websites linked to the Pravda brand.
The research highlights a clear pattern of targeted disinformation, with former Soviet states bearing the brunt of the campaign. A staggering 24.4% of the analyzed publications were aimed at these countries, followed by Central Europe (13.9%) and the Balkan states (11.9%). Moldova, Latvia, and Estonia emerged as the top three countries targeted, with alarmingly high publication rates per capita. This targeted approach, according to the analysis, suggests coordinated disinformation campaigns designed to manipulate public opinion and destabilize these regions. While representing a smaller segment of the overall population studied, the former Soviet and Balkan states combined accounted for over half of the total publications, underscoring the strategic importance of these regions to the Kremlin’s disinformation efforts.
The disproportionate focus on these specific regions is not accidental. The report notes that these areas are of significant geopolitical interest to the Kremlin, and the disinformation campaigns are likely aimed at influencing political processes, eroding social cohesion, and ultimately destabilizing these regions. The analysis pointed out that the intensity of publications per capita in the most targeted countries was dramatically higher—up to 56 times—than in Western democracies. This disparity underscores the sophisticated nature of the Kremlin’s approach, which tailors its disinformation campaigns to specific target audiences and leverages local languages and narratives to maximize impact. The strategic goal appears to be to shape information environments in these vulnerable regions to align with Russia’s geopolitical objectives.
The Pravda network’s modus operandi involves automated reposting of content sourced from Russian news outlets, social media platforms, and Telegram channels. This content is then translated into various languages to bypass sanctions and effectively reach local populations. The analysis further links the operation to TigerWeb, a Crimea-based IT company reportedly connected to Russian occupation authorities and potentially to individuals within President Putin’s inner circle, including figures associated with oligarch Arkady Rotenberg. This connection strengthens the case for a state-sponsored disinformation campaign orchestrated at the highest levels of the Russian government. The network displays a high degree of sophistication, employing advanced tactics to disseminate its propaganda and evade detection.
By early 2025, the Pravda ecosystem had expanded significantly, encompassing hundreds of news aggregators and 140 subdomains targeting over 83 countries in dozens of languages. This rapid growth demonstrates the Kremlin’s commitment to expanding its reach and influence globally. Furthermore, the report reveals a concerning new tactic employed by the network: "LLM grooming." This involves flooding the internet with millions of articles specifically crafted for consumption by artificial intelligence (AI) systems. This strategy seeks to manipulate AI algorithms and permanently embed pro-Russian narratives within the knowledge base of these systems, thereby influencing future information outputs and potentially shaping global perceptions in the long term.
The findings of this analysis paint a disturbing picture of a well-organized, state-sponsored disinformation campaign designed to undermine democratic processes and destabilize regions of strategic importance to the Kremlin. The targeted focus on the former Soviet states, Central Europe, and the Balkans highlights the vulnerability of these regions to such manipulation. The sheer volume of publications, the high per capita targeting in specific regions, and the connection to individuals within the Russian government point to a coordinated and sophisticated effort to shape information environments. The adoption of new tactics such as "LLM grooming" further underscores the evolving nature of this threat and the long-term implications for global information integrity. Addressing this challenge requires international cooperation, enhanced media literacy, and robust mechanisms for identifying and countering disinformation campaigns.
