Poland’s Vulnerability to Disinformation Exposed: A Call for Urgent Action
A chilling report released by the Polish government’s commission on Russian and Belarusian influence has sounded the alarm on the nation’s susceptibility to foreign disinformation campaigns. The report, focusing primarily on the period following the COVID-19 pandemic’s outbreak in 2020, paints a stark picture of Russia’s intensified efforts to manipulate public opinion and destabilize Poland through a sophisticated arsenal of disinformation tactics. Gen. Jarosław Stróżyk, the head of the commission’s disinformation task force and chief of Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service, delivered a blunt assessment: Poland must drastically bolster its defenses against this insidious threat.
The report lays bare Russia’s ambition to achieve "informational dominance" by distorting public narratives and manipulating social processes through a variety of methods. These range from traditional diplomacy and propaganda to cutting-edge cyber-infiltration and hacking attacks. The study specifically identifies the hacker group Ghostwriter/UNC 1151 as a major player in these destabilizing activities, highlighting their role in undermining political stability across Central Europe. The financial commitment to these disinformation operations is staggering, estimated to be between USD 2 billion and USD 4 billion annually. This vast investment underscores the seriousness of the threat and the need for a robust counter-strategy.
Poland’s current counter-disinformation efforts are deemed woefully inadequate by the commission, characterized as "insufficient, ad hoc, inconsistent, and often superficial." The report sharply criticizes the lack of a cohesive and coordinated defense strategy amongst Polish institutions, particularly singling out the foreign ministry. It points to the absence of a systematic, long-term plan, with countermeasures largely limited to passive monitoring, training, and vague cooperation guidelines. Furthermore, previous Polish authorities are accused of inaction despite possessing intelligence on individuals and organizations actively spreading pro-Russian and pro-Belarusian disinformation. This failure to act decisively, the commission argues, has significantly hampered Poland’s ability to effectively identify and neutralize information threats, leaving the nation vulnerable to state-sponsored manipulation.
The report identifies a pivotal setback in Poland’s counter-disinformation capabilities: the 2015 dismantling of a planned NATO counterintelligence center in Warsaw specifically designed to combat Russian disinformation. This incident is described as a crippling blow to both Poland’s and NATO’s ability to wage effective cognitive warfare—the strategic manipulation of public perception and decision-making. The forced entry into the NATO Counterintelligence Center of Excellence by associates of then-Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz, led by his aide Bartłomiej Misiewicz, involved breaching security protocols and accessing classified materials. This controversial action raised serious concerns about Poland’s commitment to its NATO obligations and significantly hampered the alliance’s collective ability to counter disinformation. Subsequent legal analyses confirmed the center’s international status, highlighting the overreach of the Polish officials involved.
The commission’s comprehensive 80-page report, available on the justice ministry’s website, provides a detailed examination of Russian cognitive warfare tactics targeting Poland. It delves into specific strategies employed, dissects major propaganda narratives, and assesses Poland’s preparedness to counteract these manipulative tactics. The report includes in-depth case studies focusing on disinformation campaigns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border, climate change issues, and Russian interference in elections within Georgia, Moldova, and Romania in 2024. This in-depth analysis provides valuable insights into the evolving nature of disinformation threats and emphasizes the urgent need for a more robust and proactive response.
Gen. Stróżyk stressed the imperative for Poland to significantly strengthen its institutional response to disinformation. He underscored the report’s central finding: Poland must take more decisive action, both institutionally and practically, to counteract the insidious threat posed by Russian and Belarusian disinformation campaigns, as well as other emerging threats in the information space. The report criticizes previous government decisions that weakened national security, including the abandonment of plans for a dedicated cybersecurity department within the Internal Security Agency in 2016. It also highlights the inadequacy of the foreign ministry’s Strategic Communications Unit, initially staffed with a mere three employees and therefore ill-equipped to mount an effective response. Similarly, the National Research Institute’s Disinformation Prevention Department, launched in late 2022, was found to be underutilized, further demonstrating a lack of commitment to tackling the disinformation challenge.
The commission puts forward a series of recommendations to enhance Poland’s resilience against disinformation. Key among these is fostering closer cooperation between government authorities and media outlets, especially during crises, to prevent information gaps and ensure accurate reporting. The panel advocates for public institutions to provide journalists with direct access to eyewitnesses and uncensored visual materials, enabling them to counter disinformation narratives with verifiable facts. Furthermore, the report proposes that intelligence agencies declassify and publish reports on disinformation threats, empowering the public with the knowledge to recognize and resist manipulation. The report emphasizes the need for a comprehensive anti-disinformation strategy incorporating input from experts, journalists, and civil society organizations, and calls for increased public funding to support these efforts. Gen. Stróżyk also announced the commission’s intention to submit a report to the prosecutor’s office within 10 days regarding the dismantling of regional Internal Security Agency offices under the previous government, a move that significantly weakened Poland’s intelligence capabilities. The commission, established in May 2023 as an advisory body to the prime minister, is tasked with analyzing state documents, academic research, and expert reports to assess the impact of foreign influence on Polish public life. Its findings and recommendations are critical to fortifying Poland’s defenses against disinformation and safeguarding its democratic processes. The next report is anticipated in March and will likely offer further insights into the ongoing challenge of combating disinformation and safeguarding Poland’s information space.
