Greenland’s Digital Frontier: Navigating the Emerging Threat of Disinformation in the Arctic
The tranquil public discourse of Greenland, once shielded from external manipulation, now faces the escalating threat of disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign actors. This unsettling reality came to light in 2019 with the emergence of a fabricated letter, purportedly from Greenland’s then-Foreign Minister, Ane Lone Bagger, soliciting US Senator Tom Cotton’s support for Greenlandic independence. This incident, attributed to either Russia or China by experts, exposed Greenland’s vulnerability to malicious foreign influence. While no subsequent incidents of this magnitude have been documented, the potential for further manipulation remains a significant concern, particularly with the advent of sophisticated AI-powered translation tools.
The recent accessibility of Greenlandic language through platforms like ChatGPT represents a paradigm shift. Previously, language barriers provided a degree of protection against large-scale disinformation campaigns. Now, the ability to effortlessly translate Greenlandic text opens the door for the proliferation of fabricated content, significantly amplifying the risk of manipulation. This newfound vulnerability prompted the University of Greenland, in collaboration with the Think Tank Digital Infrastructure, to conduct a comprehensive study on the looming threat of disinformation in the Arctic nation. This report serves as a critical benchmark for future research and underscores the urgent need for proactive measures to counter this emerging challenge.
The study highlights the distinction between disinformation, which is intentionally false information spread with malicious intent, and misinformation, which is inaccurate information shared without the intent to deceive. Focusing specifically on state-sponsored disinformation, the researchers analyzed a vast dataset of Facebook posts, comments, and shared links across prominent Greenlandic groups and pages. While the study did not uncover any concrete evidence of active disinformation campaigns at the time of analysis, the researchers emphasize that the report forms a baseline for ongoing monitoring and future investigations. The potential for future manipulation remains a serious concern given the evolving capabilities of AI and the increasing geopolitical interest in the Arctic region.
The list of potential perpetrators extends beyond the usual suspects of Russia and China. The researchers acknowledge that actors from various nations, including the US, Canada, and others with vested interests in Greenland’s resources or geopolitical positioning, could potentially engage in disinformation activities. The study underscores the importance of maintaining a broad perspective and analyzing any potential disinformation efforts irrespective of their origin. This vigilance is essential to safeguarding Greenland’s democratic processes and protecting its citizens from manipulation.
The study identified Greenland’s relationship with Denmark as a particularly sensitive area, potentially susceptible to future disinformation campaigns. This vulnerability stems from the ongoing debate and strong emotions surrounding Greenland’s autonomy within the Danish Realm. Disinformation campaigns often target topics of heightened public interest and existing divisions, seeking to exacerbate tensions and sow discord. The researchers emphasize the importance of public awareness and critical thinking skills to effectively counter such manipulative tactics. Strengthening media literacy and fostering a discerning public discourse will be crucial in mitigating the impact of future disinformation efforts.
Greenland’s small population, while often seen as a disadvantage, could paradoxically offer a degree of protection. The close-knit nature of Greenlandic society, where individuals are often interconnected through shared acquaintances and community ties, can make it more difficult for anonymous actors or automated bots to infiltrate social networks and spread disinformation undetected. However, the novelty of online disinformation in the Greenlandic language poses a unique challenge. Unlike communities with longer exposure to online manipulation, Greenlandic speakers may be less attuned to recognizing deceptive tactics. This lack of prior experience necessitates proactive educational initiatives to equip citizens with the skills to identify and critically evaluate information online.
The report’s findings hold implications not just for Greenland, but for other Arctic regions facing similar linguistic and geopolitical challenges. The accessibility of Indigenous languages through AI translation tools exposes communities like the Inuit in Nunavut and the Sami in Scandinavia to the same risks of disinformation. These communities, often at the center of complex resource development and geopolitical discussions, are particularly vulnerable to manipulation seeking to exploit existing tensions and sow division. International collaboration and knowledge sharing will be vital in building resilience to disinformation across the Arctic region. By learning from Greenland’s experience, other Arctic communities can proactively prepare for and mitigate the potential impacts of disinformation campaigns.
