EU’s Digital Services Act Falls Short of Expectations in Protecting Civic Discourse and Electoral Integrity
The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA), enacted to rein in the power of large digital platforms, has failed to meet expectations in safeguarding civic discourse and electoral integrity. A review of the first risk assessments submitted by major platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Google, YouTube, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter) reveals a superficial approach to identifying and mitigating risks, concentrating heavily on election-specific disinformation while neglecting broader threats to democratic processes. The DSA aimed to foster a digital public sphere that promotes informed debate, protects diverse viewpoints, and facilitates meaningful citizen engagement. However, these initial reports demonstrate a significant gap between regulatory aspirations and platform accountability.
The platforms’ risk assessments exhibit a pattern of evasion, narrowly defining risks and downplaying their own role in shaping online discourse. Instead of addressing systemic issues, they focus primarily on content moderation and reactive measures against harmful behavior. This approach fails to acknowledge the structural ways in which platform design, algorithms, and recommender systems can influence public understanding of political and social issues, amplify extreme viewpoints, and erode trust in institutions. While disinformation is undoubtedly a serious concern, the platforms’ limited focus on this single issue allows them to sidestep broader questions of algorithmic bias, echo chambers, and the suppression of legitimate speech.
Meta’s reports for Facebook and Instagram, for example, frame risks primarily in terms of harmful actors and behaviors, neglecting to examine how their platforms’ algorithms might contribute to the spread of misinformation or reinforce ideological divisions. The near-identical nature of the reports for both platforms, despite their distinct user demographics and engagement dynamics, further underscores the superficiality of their analysis. Google and YouTube, despite acknowledging some risks to civic discourse, prioritize election-related disinformation while failing to address the influence of search rankings and recommendations on public perception and the formation of political opinions.
TikTok, while acknowledging disinformation risks, downplays its overall impact and fails to address the platform’s growing influence on political narratives. The platform also neglects to address concerns related to influencer marketing and its potential to manipulate public opinion, particularly during elections. X, on the other hand, almost entirely dismisses its responsibility for shaping online discourse, framing content moderation as a potential threat to freedom of expression. This stance ignores growing evidence of how engagement-driven algorithms can amplify extreme viewpoints and distort political representation.
This narrow framing of risks allows platforms to focus on reactive measures, such as content removal and fact-checking partnerships, rather than addressing the underlying structural problems that contribute to a degraded online environment. By prioritizing easily quantifiable metrics like the number of posts removed, they avoid engaging with the more complex and challenging task of assessing the overall impact of their platforms on democratic processes. This approach is akin to treating the symptoms of a disease while ignoring its root cause.
The DSA’s goal of protecting civic discourse requires a more comprehensive and proactive approach to risk assessment. Platforms must move beyond a narrow focus on election-related disinformation and engage with the broader challenges posed by their algorithmic systems. This includes greater transparency about how their algorithms function, how they shape content visibility, and how they might contribute to phenomena like echo chambers and political polarization. The DSA’s success hinges on platforms taking genuine ownership of their role in shaping online discourse and implementing meaningful reforms that address systemic risks, not just surface-level symptoms.
A robust and standardized risk assessment process, incorporating stakeholder input and independent oversight, is essential for holding platforms accountable. This process should not only identify potential risks but also evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures and ensure that platforms are actively working to improve the quality of online discourse. The future of democracy in the digital age depends on platforms recognizing their responsibility to foster a healthy and vibrant public sphere, not just during elections, but throughout the year. Failing to address these systemic issues will continue to undermine democratic institutions and erode public trust.
